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Abstract 
Livestock value chains are an important source of employment, income and nutrition in 
developing countries. Increasing income has led to high demand for animal source products. 
Zoonotic diseases pose a public health risk to people producing, handling, processing and 
consuming animal products; with value chains creating a contact networks for transmission. 
Biosecurity measures constitute a cheap, integrated approach and affordable way of disease 
control from farm to fork as advocated by the concept of ‘One Health’ and ‘EcoHealth’.  
 
This research used mixed methods - qualitative and quantitative methods. A semi-structured 
questionnaire was used to test knowledge, attitude and practices of value chain actors. 
Sampling techniques used included snowballing and convenience sampling in markets days as 
no register of actors existed, aiming to reach as many actors as possible. 
 
Participatory mapping exercises were utilised to map activities and biosecurity measures in 
the value chain and evaluate occupational risk, biosecurity measures adopted and drivers of 
adoption. This was complemented with key informant interviews conducted with key actors 
including government institutions employees. 
 
Results indicate low knowledge of diseases, symptoms and biosecurity measures among value 
chain actors reflected by low adoption of biosecurity measures. Poor handling of food products 
exist, which increases the risk of contamination and at the same time exposes actors’ to 
diseases. There is non-enforcement of laws, inadequate extension services, governance 
challenges and low institutional support for actors to implement and adopt biosecurity 
measures. Qualitative analysis or risks highlighted many gaps that need to be addressed 
urgently. 
 
Risks associated with milk and meat safety hazards require a cooperative approach of the value 
chain as a whole (from farmers, meat processors and consumers to government authorities) as 
a lapse at any point of the value chain (inspection, processing, distribution and meal 
preparation) poses a risk to human health as well as environmental and animal health (Butler 
et al. 2003; FAO 2011). 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Transmitted from animals to humans, zoonoses are infectious diseases which affect countless 
numbers of lives globally and as such, constitute a major public health concern (Bengis et al. 
2004; Bryant 2009). Regarded as the only cost-effective means of reducing the impact of 
zoonoses on countries’ health and agricultural sectors, and society in general; disease control 
at livestock value chain level offers an enormous opportunity to alleviate poverty, disease 
burden and improve livelihoods especially in the developing world (WHO 2009b). 
 
Biosecurity has been defined in a number of different ways, from the ‘exclusion, eradication 
or effective management of risks posed by pests and diseases to the economy, environment and 
human health’, to the ‘protection of industries, environment and public wellbeing’ from the 
‘negative impacts of pests and diseases’ (Frampton 2010; DEFRA 2008). 
 
The broadest definition of biosecurity is that it is a strategic and integrated approach that 
encompasses policy and regulatory frameworks for analysing and managing relevant risks to 
human [and] animal [...] life and health, and associated risks to the environment” (Frampton 
2010; FAO 2010a; FAO 2007). Alternatively it can be defined as an approach designed to 
decrease or prevent the transmission of infectious diseases in crops and animals. However this 
definition has been expanded to include all efforts to prevent intentional or unintentional harm 
to agriculture, human and animal health. It can also be said as an approach to tackle incidents 
in event of bioterrorism attack (Meyerson & Reaser 2002). 
 
Zoonotic and food-borne diseases are transmitted from animals to humans through 
consumption of animal products and contact with animals, animal fluids or faecal waste. 
Human reliance on animal and animal products for their livelihood puts them at risk of 
contracting zoonotic diseases like E. coli, anthrax, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, rabies, 
Taenia solium cysticercosis and cystic echinococcosis (WHO 2010; Ian Maudlin 2009; 
WHO/DFID-AHP 2006).  
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Hazards in the milk and livestock value chain can be categorised as follows: 
 
i) Biological Hazards 
These are biological agents common in meat and milk products, and also in livestock, which 
have the potential to lead to zoonotic disease infection when transmitted via foodstuffs destined 
for human consumption. These agents include Salmonella, Campylobacter, verotoxinogenic 
Escherichia coli (including Escherichia coli O157:H7), Listeria monocytogenes, Toxoplasma, 
Leptospira, Coxiella burnetii (Q fever) – Brucella – Mycobacterium (tuberculosis) – Yersinia 
enterocolitica – prions (bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent, etc.), parasites such as 
Taenia solium, Taenia saginata and Trichinella spiralis (OIE 2006). 
 
ii) Chemical Hazards 
These are chemical products or physical objects which are found in animal source products 
such as drug residues (notably antibiotics); residues of chemical products used on the farm 
(pesticides, disinfectants); environmental contaminants (dioxins, polychlorinated biphenyls 
[PCBs], polyaromatic hydrocarbons [PAHs], mycotoxins, heavy metals, radioactive isotopes 
etc. (Kang’ethe et al. 2010; OIE 2006). 
 
iii) Physical Hazards 
These are foreign bodies which can contaminate food (needles, fragments of glass, pieces of 
plastic or metal.) and originate mostly from processing activities (O I E 2006). 
 
A study in three major towns in Kenya by Kang’ethe et al. (2005) estimated a seroprevalence 
rate of between 2.4 -3.4 % of brucella in milk; and on average, 500,000 cases of brucellosis are 
reported annually in developing countries (Mohamed et al. 2010). Figures of brucellosis 
prevalence may even be higher in wildlife which are in constant interaction with livestock in 
extensive grazing systems (Godfroid et al. 2013; Fèvre et al. 2006). Equating to more than 
55,000 cases annually, 99% of rabies cases occur in developing countries (WHO 2010). WHO 
(2010) also estimates that nearly 2 billion gastrointestinal bacterial infections, and about 70% 
of mortality in children under 5 years old can be attributed to contaminated food and water 
globally (McDermott & Delia 2011). 
 
Zoonotic diseases are responsible for high mortality and morbidity in developing countries. In 
particular, among children under 5 years, mortality is linked to a number of zoonosis such as 
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salmonellosis and mycobacterium bovis (DFID 2012). Zoonoses also pose a challenge to 
population segments with compromised immunity, for example, HIV/AIDS patients and 
diabetes patients (Bickett-weddle 2009). Understanding and managing zoonoses should be a 
priority for Kenya, in the context of achieving the United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG), especially MDG 1: to eradicate extreme poverty associated with diseases like 
neglected tropical zoonoses (MDG 4), aimed at reducing child mortality and (MDG 6) aimed 
at combatting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (United Nations 2014b; United Nations 
2014a; United Nations 2014c; Kang’ethe et al. 2010). 
 
Prevalence of zoonotic diseases is particularly high among livestock value chain actors who 
handle animal products; farmers, slaughterhouse (abattoir) workers, veterinary personnel, meat 
and milk vendors (Cook et al. 2013; Dowd et al. 2013; WHO 2010). High rates of prevalence 
in meat value chain actors, for example, is due to a high rate of contamination during 
processing, which arises from slaughter house cross-contamination - especially in unhygienic 
slaughter places (Cook et al. 2013).  
 
Developing countries lack strong government policies on food safety and have weak 
institutions without clear mandates to carry out inspection, or low capacity to enforce laws. 
Given their weak health care systems with frequent misdiagnosis and underreporting of disease 
incidents, adoption of biosecurity measures - such as use of personal protective equipment 
during slaughtering processes, meat inspection before consumption, boiling milk, hygienic 
milk and meat packaging, proper waste management and quarantining newly purchased 
animals in livestock value chains - can play a significant role in reducing risks of zoonotic 
diseases (Schelling 2002; Krause & Hendrick 2011; Ocaido 2013). 
 
Empirical evidence, however, shows that adoption of biosecurity measures among meat and 
milk value chain actors in developing countries is very low. In the case of Kenya, a thematic 
paper by IFAD (2006) reveals that these actors operate in a weak formal system which does 
not adhere to food safety regulations; and having had limited training, the majority do not have 
knowledge about zoonoses, meaning that their adoption and implementation of risk mitigation 
measures is low (Kang’ethe 2008). In addition to lack of formal training, this can be attributed 
to the fact that  most value chain actors like animal health service providers and food vendors 
are operating without relevant official approvals (Onono et al. 2013).  
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Risky practices to avoid economic losses in the event of animal death and cultural practices 
such as the removal of hides from dead cattle - due to the cultural belief that an animal buried 
with its skin will not be replaced or herd size will not increase – are common. In addition to 
this, poor sanitation and hygiene practices, governance challenges ranging from insufficient 
equipment to disease monitoring and testing facilities, poorly trained workers, or common staff 
shortage, make it difficult for developing countries such as Kenya to combat zoonoses (Kioko 
2012). 
 
Existing laws that are relevant to mitigating the risks associated with zoonoses infection and 
spread are often out-dated, especially food safety regulations, and they are often the 
responsibility of multiple public sector departments which makes it difficult to ensure effective 
implementation and enforcement (Kioko 2012). The costs involved, the time required to be 
committed, and the unproven effectiveness of biosecurity measures greatly inhibits adoption 
of biosecurity measures (Makita 2009; Gunn et al. 2008). 
 
To date, most of the research on adoption of biosecurity measures has been undertaken in 
developed countries and as a consequence, comparatively little is known about adoption of 
biosecurity measures in developing countries. In the case of Kenya, for example, there is a 
dearth of information about biosecurity measures practised by value chain actors, their 
knowledge and perception of biosecurity measures, and the relationship between zoonoses and 
biosecurity measures. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
At a global level, animals are an important source of food and income generation, and as a 
consequence, there is a high risk of transmission and incidence of zoonoses. Newly emerging, 
re-emerging or endemic food-borne and zoonotic diseases are major problems for developing 
countries like Kenya as they result in high morbidity and mortality in humans due to weak 
policies and institutions (WHO 2010). 
 
In developing countries, there is a higher risk of zoonoses transmission from animals and 
animal products to people who handle and process animal products, as well as those who 
consume the resultant animal products. Considering zoonotic disease transmission from a value 
chains perspective highlights the recognition that zoonotic diseases are transmitted through 
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links with society, from animals to producers and consumers, through a complex web of value 
chain activities and animal products for consumption. 
 
Adoption of biosecurity measures across all stages of the value chain offers a chance to reduce 
the risk of zoonotic disease spread and improves food safety. However, a major constraint 
concerns a limited knowledge of risks posed by zoonotic diseases. Despite this, there is a 
limited promotion of biosecurity measures by policy makers in developing countries, and in 
Kenya in particular very few or no studies have been carried out. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
In the context of the meat and milk value chain in Kenya, the main research questions which 
this study answers are:  
1. What are the biosecurity measures adopted by value chain actors to reduce risk of 
zoonotic disease infections? 
2. What is the perception and awareness of actors in the meat and milk value chain with 
regards to adopted biosecurity measures, and what is the relevance of these measures 
in terms of every day control of zoonosis infections? 
3. What factors influence the adoption of biosecurity measures and to what extent do value 
chain actors adhere to these measures and other food security regulations? 
 
1.4 Broad Objective 
This study’s main aim was to explore the understanding of the concept of biosecurity among 
value chain actors, their perceptions regarding the effectiveness of biosecurity measures in 
controlling zoonotic diseases and the factors influencing perceptions, and more importantly 
adoption of such measures. 
 
1.5 Specific Objectives  
 To explore value chain actors’ knowledge and understanding of zoonotic risks. 
 To assess knowledge and perception of the significance of these identified zoonotic risks. 
 To assess value chain actors’ incorporation of biosecurity measures in their activities and 
workplaces. 
 To identify the factors influencing adoption of biosecurity measures among different value 
chain actors. 
20 
 
1.6 Scope of Study 
This study focused on meat and milk value chains in Kenya. The main actors in the value chain 
analysed include traders, slaughterhouses (abattoirs and its workers) transporters of animals 
and meat products, and the butcheries engaged in retailing. Producers and consumers, who are 
essential parts of the value chain, were not be considered in the context of this study and thesis, 
but will constitute a core part of a complementary thesis undertaken by a fellow student 
focusing on household and farm level biosecurity,  food preparation and handling. 
 
1.7 Justification of the Study  
Zoonoses have gained importance in recent years due to the emergence of new diseases of 
animal origin including avian influenza and swine flu, in an era of increased human-assisted 
movement of animals and animal products through value chains (Bengis et al. 2004). Food 
safety is becoming increasingly important and is attracting growing attention from public 
health actors, who have concerns related to the extent to which zoonotic food-borne diseases 
result in a high burden of global illness and mortality annually. 
 
For countries such as Kenya, which have a heavy burden of endemic diseases, the increased 
incidence of zoonoses is worrying. The country already has a high prevalence of three of the 
five tropical zoonoses classified as ‘neglected’ by the World Health Organisation (WHO) - 
namely cutaneous leishmaniasis, trypanosomiasis, echinococcosis, cysticercosis (Taenia 
Solium) and rabies (WHO 2009b). 
 
Animal sourced food is viewed as being responsible for this high prevalence in the human 
population and in this context, many believe that there is a real opportunity to tackle these 
zoonoses stemming from food unsafety through design and implementation of a biosecurity 
plan to reduce and eliminate risk of disease transmission along the value chain, from farm to 
fork (Ocaido et al. 2013). These diseases not only pose challenges to human health in Kenya, 
but could also potentially threaten the tourism industry (Magwedere et al. 2012), due to 
interaction of wildlife-domestic animal that can lead to spill over between livestock and 
wildlife with diseases like rabies, anthrax and brucellosis shown to exist in wild animals in 
national parks and game reserves (FAO 2012b; Wambwa 2002). 
 
Zoonotic diseases are transmitted to humans via value chains through handling of animals and 
consumption of animal products. Most slaughterhouses have sub-standard hygiene and this 
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leads to cross contamination of foodstuffs which are destined for human consumption (Ocaido 
et al. 2013; Muwonge et al. 2010). Workers in slaughterhouses have been shown to have higher 
prevalence of zoonoses compared to the general population in Kenya and Uganda. In this sense, 
they act as a reservoir and source of contamination of foodstuffs which they handle (Nabukenya 
2013; van Helden et al. 2010). In most places where food is prepared and sold, there is no 
refrigeration and meat cannot be kept frozen over time, leading to deterioration of quality. 
Butchers often do not have training on food safety and value chain actors and consumers’ 
knowledge, attitudes and practises as regards preventing transmission and spread of zoonotic 
diseases are not very good. Practices leading to transmission and spread include consumption 
of raw meat, blood and milk and poor sanitary standards (Kankya et al. 2011; Delia et al. 2008; 
Kang’ethe et al. 2005; ILRI 2011). 
 
Although zoonotic diseases are common in Kenya, there is very little or no collaboration 
between veterinary and human health practitioners. The Government of Kenya is trying to 
address the issue of zoonotic diseases by effectively enforcing existing laws related to food 
safety, engaging all stakeholders in formulating a food safety program and in strengthening the 
capacity of institutions that promote food safety. There is a significant need to strengthen 
infrastructural and managerial capacity in risk analysis, to ensure better understanding of the 
risks associated with zoonoses and to enable biosecurity measures to be identified which can 
contribute to reducing these risks (Goverment of Kenya 2012; Goverment of Kenya 2010; 
Government of Kenya 2012; Omemo et al. 2012) 
 
Very few studies have been undertaken to determine diseases prevalence in particular 
population groups – zoonoses affect the poor most significantly - and as a result, a lot of 
diseases are endemic and neglected. There is also widespread misdiagnosis and underreporting 
of these diseases (Jeo 2014; Hotez & Kamath 2009; McDermott & Delia 2011). So this study 
is deemed justified according to the above observations. 
 
1.8 Overview of the thesis 
Chapter one has explored the objectives and justification for the study and highlights the 
important questions that this study seeks to answer. Chapter two will look at the diseases to be 
studied, their mode of transmission and why they are an important public health concern. 
Chapter three will be a brief overview of the conceptual framework for this study while 
highlighting how various actors and institutions interact in the meat and milk value chains. 
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Chapter four will highlight the study area and methodology employed by the study, and chapter 
five and six presents the results of the study, chapter seven discusses the findings in detail and 
compares them to existing studies and finally draws recommendations presented in chapter 
eight. The thesis ends with a brief conclusion followed by references and annexes. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Biosecurity 
Important at the national and international level, biosecurity refers to the implementation of 
measures which protect health by reducing the risk of introduction and spread of disease and 
disease agents, and which take into consideration the fact that socio-economic factors influence 
human behaviour and therefore, also compliance (Frampton 2010; FAO 2010a; FAO 2007). 
 
As summed up by DEFRA 2008, biosecurity is the prevention of disease-causing pathogens 
from entering or leaving any animal related places and products. In the context of livestock 
value chains, therefore, biosecurity entails adoption by value chain actors of a set of attitudes, 
behaviours and practices leading to reduced zoonoses risk and pathogen spread from 
domesticated animals and their products as well as related waste products (FAO 2008a; FAO 
2010a). 
 
The FAO has developed a country evaluation tool to assess national capacity to integrate food 
safety and animal health through a biosecurity approach, as part of its strategy to facilitate 
management of risks posed by zoonoses to human health and the environment. This strategy 
encompasses policy and regulatory frameworks and includes mandating of activities such as 
inspection, diagnostic services and certification - both at the farm and value chain levels 
(Vanderwal 2010). 
 
According to the FAO (2008), there are three principle elements to biosecurity: 
1) Segregation or the creation and maintenance of barriers limiting the potential of 
infected animals or infected products and material coming into contact with uninfected 
animals or areas where the zoonotic disease is not present. It is the most effective 
biosecurity measure if applied to curb disease spread and prevents most cross-infection. 
It may involve isolation and also quarantine of infected or suspected sick animals to 
limit interaction that can lead to disease spread. 
2) Cleaning of materials, like vehicles and equipment, to remove the contaminating 
pathogen. It is a very effective control measure when handling animal and animal 
products where there is possible or high likelihood of cross-contamination, such as in 
butcheries, slaughterhouse places and food joints and transport vehicles. 
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3) Disinfection to inactivate or kill pathogens present on material or surfaces especially 
for viruses which are not eliminated by normal cleaning. 
 
As highlighted by the outbreaks in recent decades of avian influenza A subtypes H7N9 and 
H5N1, the biosecurity threat by zoonotic diseases to countries’ economic stability and 
wellbeing posed is real; and there are enormous social and economic implications associated 
with large-scale culling of infected animals, restrictions imposed on human and animal 
movement, and trade barriers imposed (Waage and Mumford 2008). 
 
Widespread perception that the threat posed by zoonotic diseases to public and environmental 
health is increasing has led to large-scale investment in programmes to eradicate zoonotic 
diseases such as smallpox and rinderpest (FAO 2006a; Delia 2012). Implementation of 
biosecurity measures and practices pose a challenge for countries with regards to realising their 
trade priorities, ensuring societal wellbeing through access to cheap food versus the need for 
safe food, and resource allocation to biosecurity programmes (Waage & Mumford 2008). 
 
In an agricultural value chain context, the prevention and control of new and endemic 
pathogens is attracting increasing global attention. There is growing recognition that the design 
and implementation of effective and appropriate biosecurity measures requires identification 
of all the mechanisms through which diseases are maintained and spread in the animal 
population and in the value chain. Unless all stages and all actors involved in the value chain 
are taken into consideration, it is often very difficult to control disease transmission and spread, 
and is particularly the case, where the value chain is complex in terms of activities such as 
processing and marketing (i.e. many actors and steps involved) (FAO 2008a). 
 
One of the main barriers facing developing countries where there is high prevalence of 
zoonoses is that most of the existing and well-known biosecurity measures which can be 
adopted have been designed in the so-called “developed world”. The potential to apply 
“developed world” measures in developing context, thus raises issues regarding their 
appropriateness for use in informal markets and value chain contexts (FAO 2008a). Although 
the importance of these measures is widely recognised (Hill 2003), to date, adoption of 
biosecurity measures has been low in countries such as Kenya. (Delia 2013) 
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Implementation of biosecurity measures depend on value chain actors attitudes towards 
management of contagious diseases of animal origin and the proposed prevention measures 
(Simon-Grifé et al. 2013). Studies have shown that actors tend to have negative attitudes 
towards biosecurity measures and practises. The reasons vary from lack of knowledge on 
effectiveness, dislike of mandatory rules and the adverse economic impacts of the measures. 
Biosecurity measures are also viewed as constituting additional work (Gunn et al. 2008). 
 
There is an urgent need to rethink current approaches  dealing with the risks posed by zoonoses 
and give priority to prevention and control of these diseases (Childs et al. 1998). Most models 
used in epidemiology capture relatively short time spans often ignoring long term and socio-
economic drivers of these diseases (Fischer et al. 2006; Kleczkowski et al. 2012). Given the 
interconnected and globalised economy and agricultural value chain environment, new 
modelling techniques are thus needed to make the global need of a ‘one world, one health’ 
strategy a reality (Schlundt et al. 2004).  
 
2.2 Zoonotic Diseases 
Zoonoses are defined as infectious diseases originating from animal reservoirs that can be 
transmitted between humans and wild or domestic animals under natural conditions and can 
also be transmitted through a vector. Zoonotic pathogens carried by animals infect humans 
through direct animal-human contact or indirectly through consumption of contaminated food 
of animal origin (Giessen et al. 2004; Slingenbergh et al. 2004). 
 
Pathogen spread occurs due to close contact with sick animals or consumption of products from 
sick animals like meat and milk. Zoonoses emerge or re-emerge due to different factors - 
alterations in ecological balance, natural or artificial pathogen mutations; wildlife migrations; 
trade globalisation; movements of people from distant areas of the planet and increased contact 
between humans and animals due to agriculture expanding to new areas. 
 
Reliance on animals for food and nutrition is also a significant factor influencing transmission 
and spread. Value chains are expanding and becoming complex - there is increased marketing 
and distribution of animals and products to distant places, due to globalisation and improved 
infrastructure, such as air travel which moves products quickly but also plays a role in fast 
transmission and spread of diseases. The global and complex nature of the problem is one of 
the main reasons that there are increasing calls for zoonoses to be tackled through a so-called 
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‘one health approach’, which involves close collaboration between animal, human and 
environmental health agencies (Battelli et al. 2006; Graham et al. 2008; FAO 2008b; FAO 
2003; Krause & Hendrick 2011) 
 
In the wake of newly emerging diseases such as avian influenza and swine flu, the economic 
losses and death associated with these diseases is huge as shown in table 1 and table 2 below 
(Pal et al. 2013; Battelli et al. 2006; Nabukenya 2013; Kahn 2006; Chomel 2001). 
 
Table 1: Number of global deaths each year in early 21st century, due to select diseases 
Disease  Numbers  
Diarrhoeal disease death (many zoonotic &neglected)  3 000 000  
HIV (a disease emerged from animals)  2 000 000 
Rabies deaths (neglected)  55 000 
Cysticercosis (pig tapeworm) deaths (neglected) 50 000  
Avian influenza H5NI (emerging)  45 
Mad cow disease (emerging)  5 
Sourced from Delia (2012) 
 
Table 2: Deaths and economic lose due to zoonotic disease 
Diseases Year Place Deaths Economic losses 
RVF  2007 Kenya 300 people US$ 30  
HPAI 2006/7 Nigeria  1.3 poultry culled 
3,057 farmers affected  
US$5.4 million 
Adapted from (Rich et al. 2009) 
 
Mortality and morbidity resulting from zoonoses is very high globally (table 1), with impact 
felt most acutely in developing countries where most of the cases occur. These diseases have 
been eliminated or controlled in developed countries of the world, but are a common 
phenomenon in developing countries - 17 % of children in developing country still die from 
diarrhoea mostly associated with zoonotic and foodborne illness (WHO 2008b). 
 
Kenya has experienced incidences of endemic zoonotic disease, with the poor people most 
significantly affected due to their limited access to health infrastructure coupled with their 
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political marginalisation (Pozio 1979; WHO 2012). The country’s high rate of zoonoses 
prevalence could be partly attributed to the poorly regulated informal value chain, which may 
pose a public health threat to consumers and value chain actors (WHO 2009a). 
 
Table 3: East Africa zoonotic disease prevalence 
Disease Sero-prevalence in East Africa livestock 
Brucellosis 8% 
Tuberculosis 8 % 
Leptospirosis 24 % 
Cysticercosis 12 % 
Overall livestock prevalence 10 % 
Estimated percentage of  
human food borne illness 
27 % 
Estimated prevalence of  
zoonoses in human 
15 % 
Based on DFID, 2012 (based on parasitological tests and seroprevalence tests) 
 
Animal keeping and animal source food may potentially carry health risks and hazards and as 
a consequence, implementing food safety and biosecurity protocols to reduce these risks has 
become a global public health concern. 
 
Zoonotic diseases pose a global threat not only to value chain actors and consumers, but also 
fundamentally to the stability of regions and countries. The list of existing zoonoses is very 
extensive, and they vary in terms of their degree of importance as regards bio-terrorism 
potential (Koplan 2001). This research study focused on rift valley fever, Q fever leptospirosis, 
anthrax, rabies, brucellosis, salmonellosis and bovine tuberculosis in Kenya. 
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Table 4: Selected preliminary prevalence in humans sampled in DDDAC Project 
Disease Sero-prevalence in Bura Kenya (%) 
Rift valley fever 15 
Brucellosis 4 
West Nile virus 32 
Q fever 25 
Dengue fever 26 
Based on results (unpublished), ILRI 2014 
 
2.3 Bio-Terrorism Potential of Zoonoses 
Zoonoses are not only considered a major public health threat, but are also considered having 
bioterrorism potential. Bio-warfare or the use of infectious pathogens - including those 
transmitting or spreading zoonoses - has been used both intentionally and unintentionally since 
time immemorial to cause death or weaken the enemy. During World War One and Two, 
countries such as Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the USA and Russia invested heavily 
in the development of biological weapons for use in warfare, engaging in thorough research 
and testing (Frischknecht 2008; Harris 1992; James w. martin 1997; Npr.org 2014). 
 
In 1984, an act of bioterrorism by the Rajneeshee cult resulted in contamination with 
salmonella of salad bars in Oregon, USA; which led more than 750 people become seriously 
ill. In 1995, the cult group Aum Shinrikyo released the nerve agent sarin in the subway system 
in Tokyo, Japan; killing 12 people and rendering thousands of people sick. Most recently, in 
2001, anthrax spores were transmitted through letters in the USA (Npr.org 2014; Frischknecht 
2008). There is fear of scientific research being abused to develop virulent forms with 
sequenced genomes of these pathogens easily accessible in published literature. Some 
pathogens may be available in regions of the world where zoonoses are endemic, as well as in 
places where experiments were carried out especially those which have resistant spores like 
anthrax (Wallerstein 2002; Glaser 2002; Harris 1992). 
 
CDC has classified zoonoses into the following classes based on their bioterrorism potential as 
shown in table 5 (Noah et al. 2002; Koplan 2001) 
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Category A: Highly infectious with high morbidity 
Category B: Moderately easy to disseminate, cause moderate morbidity and low 
mortality rates, and require specific enhancements of diagnostic capacity and 
surveillance activities. 
Category C: Emerging pathogens that could be engineered for mass dissemination in 
the future because of availability, ease of production and dissemination, and potential 
for high morbidity and mortality and major health impact. 
 
Table 5: Important Zoonoses according to Bio-Terrorism Potential 
Category A Category B Category C 
 (smallpox), 
 Bacillus anthracis 
(anthrax),  
 Yersinia pestis (plague), 
  Francisella tularensis 
(tularemia),  
 Arena viruses (Lassa 
fever and Argentine 
haemorrhagic fever and 
related viruses),  
 Filo viruses (Ebola 
haemorrhagic fever and 
Marburg haemorrhagic 
fever),  
 Clostridium botulinum 
toxin (botulism). 
 Coxiella burnetti (Q fever),  
 Brucella spp (brucellosis), 
  Burkholderia mallei 
(glanders),  
 Alpha viruses 
(Venezuelan/eastern/western 
encephalitis),  
 Epsilon toxin of C. 
perfringens,  
 Staphylococcus enterotoxin B  
 Salmonella spp,  
 Shigella  
 Dysenteriae,  
 Escherichia coli O157:H7,  
 Vibrio cholera 
 Cryptosporidium parvum 
 Nipah virus,  
 Hantaviruses,  
 Tick-borne 
haemorrhagic 
fever viruses,  
 Tick-borne 
encephalitis 
viruses,  
 Yellow fever,  
 Multidrug-
resistant 
tuberculosis 
 
Based on (Noah et al. 2002; Koplan 2001) 
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There is a threat of zoonoses being used in ‘agro-terrorism’, which can be defined as deliberate 
introduction of disease agent against livestock or food value chain for the purpose of 
undermining stability and generating fear. It not only affects agricultural value chains but also 
erodes public confidence in the food products affected as well, which leads to reduced demand 
and affects trade for the affected county, with the rest of the world (Cupp et al. 2004; Chomel 
2001; Breeze 2004). 
 
Zoonotic agents have the potential to be used as agro-terrorism agents in targeting agricultural 
systems, leading to massive losses and food insecurity. Agriculture is the biggest sector of the 
world economy and provides employment and food for the global population, while at the same 
time contributing towards biodiversity conservation. Zoonoses can significantly impact on 
global production systems - the recent avian influenza led to big economic losses related to 
animal culling and trade restrictions (OECD 2013; Cupp et al. 2004; Mobley et al. 2001). As 
diseases can be spread through animals and animal products, value chain biosecurity is very 
important, with concerns leading to calls for governments to intervene and create policies that 
protect the food value chains and ensure food safety from intentional contamination by 
terrorism activities (Cupp et al. 2004). 
 
Pathogens such as anthrax are stable in nature and can persist for long periods of time in spore 
form. Some of these zoonotic agents can be easily produced illegally in labs of low biosecurity 
levels and then used as bioweapons by terrorists. Anthrax has been widely studied and already 
used as a bioweapon and bioterrorism agent (Shadomy & Smith 2008; Sidel et al. 2002; Quinn 
et al. 2004). 
 
Zoonotic pathogens can be spread through food and water or even movement of live animals. 
They have capacity to cause high mortality and morbidity in the population, and their potential 
to spread fast means that they pose a global threat as a result of enhanced movements through 
air travel and animal source products in global value chains (Chomel & Marano 2009). 
 
2.4 Routes of Disease Transmission and Biosecurity Implications 
The following section will highlight the important transmission routes of diseases of 
importance to this study ad zoonoses related to meat and milk value chains. 
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2.4.1 Direct Contact between Animals 
Close and prolonged repeated contact with infected or susceptible animals in holding grounds, 
open markets and during transportation, increases the chance of disease transmission to humans 
and animals. Pathogen shedding is highest in the acute phase of infection, though not constant 
during the infection phase, and some sick animals that look healthy may be shedding enough 
levels of pathogens to spread infection. These animals are silent disease carriers, and in the 
context of the transmission and spread of endemic zoonotic diseases, pose a major threat if they 
mingle with susceptible animals and humans (Cupp 2012; Stanković 2013; Cutler et al. 2010; 
Krause & Hendrick 2011). Active disease surveillance and control of diseases in animals is 
important for silent diseases which cannot be diagnosed by evidence of clinical symptoms 
(Dórea et al. 2011; Jebara 2004). 
 
2.4.2 Airborne Transmission 
Airborne transmission is difficult to contain especially in open places such as animal markets 
and holding grounds, where a secure distance is not maintained through isolation of purchased 
animals and local animal herds. Pathogen load and resistance to desiccation in air, climatic 
conditions and the local geography are also important factors influencing disease transmission 
and spread. In pigs, aerosol transmission of pathogens across more than 4.5 km has been 
documented for Porcine Reproductive & Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS) virus and Mycoplasma 
hyopneumoniae; while under certain climatic conditions, some strains of foot and mouth virus 
can be carried by the wind for up to 20 km in cattle (FAO 2010a; Bryant 2009; OECD 2013; 
Kaneene & Thoen 2004; McCarthy et al. 2013). 
 
2.4.3 Indirect Transmission 
Indirect transmission involves any method of transmission in which the infected animal and 
susceptible person do not actually come in direct contact with each other, but where instead 
humans come into contact with objects which are contaminated such as fungi, dust, blankets, 
clothing, toys, insects, water, air, food, animal faeces, urine contaminated surfaces and 
vehicles. Poor hygiene and unsafe waste disposal increase the risk of exposure to pathogens 
(Bryant 2009; FAO 2008a; Battelli et al. 2006; Shadomy & Smith 2008; McCarthy et al. 2013; 
OECD 2013; Mangili & Gendreau 2005; Mayer 2000; Stanković 2013). 
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2.5 Zoonotic Diseases of Importance to this study 
The study focuses on the following diseases: Rift Valley fever, Q fever, anthrax, bovine 
tuberculosis, brucellosis, salmonellosis, taeniosis/cysticercosis and rabies. 
 
2.5.1 Q Fever 
Q fever is a zoonosis caused by the bacterium Coxiella burnetii. Global in distribution, Coxiella 
burnetii is shed in huge numbers in the placenta, faeces, milk and uterine fluids of infected 
cattle, sheep and goats. It can survive outside its hosts by taking on a small, dense, long-lasting 
spore-like form which is resistant to heat and drying and then contaminates soils or is spread 
by the wind in dust for long distances (McQuiston et al. 2002). Humans and animals are 
infected when they come into contact with the products and tissue of sick animals or inhale 
contaminated particles. Ticks are vectors of the disease, while the practice of applying manure 
to agricultural land also provides an avenue for disease transmission and spread. Q fever causes 
debilitating headache and fever in humans, and is considered a Category B agent and potential 
bioweapon by the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) (Ontario Veal 
Association (OVA) 2010; Sue Pepper 2006; Colorado Department of Agriculture (CDA) 2011; 
McQuiston et al. 2002; Oie 2014; Davis 2004b). 
 
2.5.2 Rift Valley Fever 
Rift Valley fever (RVF) is a vector-borne viral zoonotic disease, which is transmitted between 
animals through bites from different species of infected mosquitoes mainly from the genera 
Aedes and Culex. It is spread to humans through direct contact with infected animal tissues, 
body fluids and fomites, especially those associated with abortion in animals (Chengula et al. 
2013) . 
 
Veterinarians, health personnel, farmers and abattoir workers are at a high risk of infection 
from direct contact with infected animals and patients. Symptoms of RVF in animals include 
nasal discharge, fever and high abortion storms with mortality rates of approximately 100% 
among neonatal animals and around 10% to 20% among adult animals. In humans, clinical 
symptoms include fever, muscle pain and fatigue. Sometimes there is a second phase with 
severe bleeding (haemorrhage). Preventive measures include vaccination, dipping and 
quarantining of animals (Chengula et al. 2013; Bird & Ksiazek 2009; Musyoka 2013). 
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Socio-economic impacts of RVF include animal and human deaths, disruption of livestock 
market chains, inability of pastoralists to achieve their daily demands, inability to obtain protein 
leading to malnutrition and monetary loss at individual and national level during control of the 
disease (Chengula et al. 2013; Bird & Ksiazek 2009; Musyoka 2013). 
 
CDC has classified RVF as a Category A virus, while it is considered a ‘high consequence 
pathogen’ by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) due to its high potential to 
spread at a global level. Constituting a major threat as a biological terrorism agent, it could 
have high direct (morbidity and death) and indirect (international trade restrictions) 
implications and impact on countries currently free of the virus (where mosquitoes aren’t 
common or isolated islands) (King 2006). 
 
2.5.3 Anthrax 
Anthrax is caused by Bacillus anthracis, which has the capacity to infect large herds of animals 
at the same time and poses a serious challenge to animal and public health due to the fact that 
it has a very rapid rate of spreading. Infection in humans’ results from contact with dead animal 
carcases, meat, hides, hair and bones; while animals acquire the disease through contaminated 
feedstuff or from bacterial spores inhaled. Both humans and animals can also get infected by 
coming into contact with contaminated soil and water bodies, as well as effluent sources 
contaminated by infected animal waste (Kruse et al. 2004; Shadomy & Smith 2008; WHO 
2008a). Transboundary movement of animals especially in pastoral regions of developing 
countries is a major driver of infection. Wild animals in close proximity to pastures used by 
pastoralists also serve as a reservoir of the disease and contribute to infection of pastoral 
extensively-grazed animals (Dean et al. 2013). 
 
In humans, infection often occurs as a consequence of engagement in occupational activities 
where there is either agricultural (non-industrial) or industrial exposure. Infection mostly 
occurs in the skin, the gastrointestinal tract or the lungs. B. anthracis is a spore forming 
bacteria, and is very resistant to ultra-violet (UV) radiation, many disinfectants, heat and 
drying. As such, it can persist in the environment for many decades in its inert form (Henderson 
1999; DEFRA 2013; Kleczkowski et al. 2012). 
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As was evident following anthrax attacks in the USA whereby spores were transmitted by 
postal mail, there is a biological terrorism risk associated with exposure to the bacteria (CDC 
2012; Shadomy & Smith 2008; Davis 2004a). 
 
2.5.4 Bovine Tuberculosis 
Bovine tuberculosis is caused by Mycobacterium bovis. Mostly found in cattle, it can affect 
other animals including pigs. In humans, it is very difficult to distinguish from Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis which is mainly responsible for causing human tuberculosis. Common in pastoral 
areas, it follows transhumance patterns of animal movement. Wildlife often serves as a 
reservoir and source of infection. Mycobacterium bovis is spread through airborne droplets of 
moisture (aerosols) containing the organism which are inhaled or through consumption of 
animal products contaminated with the bacterium, such as unpasteurised milk and other dairy 
products from infected animals (DEFRA 2013; Kruse et al. 2004; Kleczkowski et al. 2012). 
 
2.5.5 Brucellosis 
Brucellosis is caused by the bacteria of the genus Brucella spp. Transmitted among animals, 
humans become infected where there is contact with animals or animal products contaminated 
with the bacteria. Infected animals experience abortions and diminished milk production. In 
80% of cases, Brucella bacteria are found in lymphatic nodes and mammary glands after the 
symptomatic phase is over, and thus infected animals continue to secrete the bacteria in their 
fluids. The bacterium causes a range of symptoms that are similar to influenza and can include 
fever, sweats, headaches, back pain and physical weakness in humans. Flu-like symptoms often 
lead to misdiagnosis of patients presenting for medical examination (Davis 2004b; Leal-
klevezas & Marti 1995). 
 
Zoonotic brucellosis is mainly transmitted by Brucella abortus which is widely prevalent in 
Kenya. Particularly high in pastoral systems, it affects between 5% to 30 % of herds compared 
to mixed cropping systems where disease prevalence is very limited or nearly non-existent 
(Kang’ethe et al. 2005). 
 
2.5.6 Salmonella 
Salmonella is caused by gram-negative bacteria of the genus Salmonella, and can affect cattle, 
sheep, pigs, poultry, horses and even household pets (Krause & Hendrick 2011). In 2009, an 
outbreak of food poisoning attributed to salmonella resulted in 388 individuals becoming ill in 
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42 states, with 18% requiring admission to hospital for medical treatment. Symptoms of 
salmonellosis range from diarrhoea, abdominal cramps and fever and appear within 8 to 72 
hours after consumption of contaminated food (Bryant 2009). Additional symptoms may 
include chills, headache, nausea and vomiting, with symptoms usually disappearing within 4 
to 7 days. Most individuals do not require treatment and fully recover by taking water to 
rehydrate their bodies, while some people are asymptomatic and do not show any symptoms 
of infection (Bryant 2009; Cutler et al. 2010). 
 
Salmonella infection can result in fatality among young children and infants, pregnant women 
and their unborn babies and older adults who are at a higher risk of contracting foodborne 
illnesses. Other important groups of people at risk of infection are individuals with reduced 
immunity due to HIV/AIDS, cancer, diabetes, kidney disease, as well as transplant patients 
(Leite et al. 2003; Bryant 2009). 
 
2.5.7 Rabies  
Rabies is caused by an RNA virus of the genus lyssavirus in the family Rhabdoviridae, which 
has the capacity to infect most of the mammal species. Widespread throughout the developing 
world, many rabies cases are recorded in Kenya and the disease is now endemic in all regions 
and classified as a notifiable disease. The majority of cases reported in Kenya are associated 
with dogs (WHO 2003) as there is a large dog population which has not been vaccinated. In 
2011, Kenya had 11 reported cases of rabies ( AU-IBAR, 2011). 
 
Transmissions occur mostly as a consequence of a bite from an infected animal or through 
contact with the RNA virus contained in saliva secretion and mucous membranes of infected 
animals. Symptoms observed in dogs can be increased aggression, random walking, drooling 
of saliva and sudden change in behaviour, paralysis and hyperaemic eyes and reduced appetite. 
Symptoms in humans include agitation, anxiety, confusion and cerebral dysfunction. In the 
later stages of the disease, victims display insomnia, abnormal behaviour and are prone to 
respiratory failure. The later stage is often fatal and recovery is rare (Kitala & Mcdermott 1995; 
Singh 2012; Karugah 1994; AU-IBAR 2011; AU-IBAR 2014b). 
 
2.5.8 Helminthic Taeniosis/Cysticercosis (Taenia saginata and T. Solium)  
Taenia solium taeniosis/cysticercosis complex is associated with poor sanitation and hygiene, 
poor animal husbandry and lack of proper meat inspection and disease control. It occurs in 
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regions where there is open defecation by humans and free-roaming by animals which graze in 
extensive systems, as there is high likelihood of coming into contact with helminth eggs. 
Humans become infected following ingestion of larval cysts (cysticerci) in raw or poorly 
cooked meat which result in taeniasis when they develop completely in the intestines. In some 
cases a person may swallow eggs of Taenia solium which develop into larval cysts, which can 
lodge in the brain causing cerebral cysticercosis (neurocysticercosis) and resulting in 
headaches, epileptic seizures, blindness, mental disturbance and even death in humans (Phiri 
et al. 2003; Nsadha 2013). 
 
A study in western Kenya by Thomas et al. (2013) found that poor animal husbandry and poor 
waste disposal are major drivers of tapeworm evolution and spread. Similar observations were 
made in a field survey undertaken in Uganda by Waiswa et al. 2009 using a single enzyme 
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), which found that 8.5% of 480 pigs surveyed were 
infected with Taenia solium. The same study, which surveyed a total of 528 homesteads, found 
that 26% of households did not have pit latrines, thereby significantly increasing the probability 
of pigs being exposed to human faeces contaminated with T. solium eggs. Poor sanitation as a 
major driver of infection has also been noted by Nsadha (2013). 
 
Implementation of biosecurity measures to control the spread of cysticercosis has been 
hampered by poor health facilities often due to lack of equity in development. There is  also a 
low level of health education, hygiene and sanitation among human populations where the 
disease is endemic (Pawlowski et al. 2005). There is need to change from reliance on ‘meat 
inspection only’ to alternative methods of inspection which can diagnose and facilitates 
taeniasis treatment and also break the lifecycle of tapeworm (Fèvre et al. 2009). Biosecurity 
measures aimed at preventing helminth transmission among animals and provision of health 
education among humans, coupled with improved disease surveillance could help eradicate 
disease. Sanitary intervention measures and provision of chemotherapy could be implemented 
in regions where there is currently high disease transmission. Increased political will, social 
support and improved financing are important in the context of enhancing the effectiveness of 
disease control programmes which could significantly reduce high morbidity and mortality 
rates in human populations (Pawlowski et al. 2005; Phiri et al. 2003; Birner & Palaniswamy 
2006). 
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2.6 Zoonoses and Biosecurity in Value Chains 
Zoonoses pose a challenge to value chain actors while the biosecurity measures when properly 
applied reduce these risks. The section below highlights the complex relationship that exists 
between value chains, zoonoses and biosecurity measures. 
2.6.1 Value Chains 
According to Kaplinsky and Morris (2000) a value chain “describes the full range of activities 
which are required to bring a product or service from conception, through the different phases 
of production (involving a combination of physical transformation and the input of various 
producer services), delivery to final consumers, and final disposal after use”. 
 
It can alternatively be defined as encompassing a wide range of services and activities, a value 
chain brings a product from conception to its sale in a final market which can be local, regional 
or even global (USAID 2006). Involving market-focused collaboration among different 
stakeholders who produce and market value-added products (IFAD 2011a; IFAD 2006), it 
engages actors such as input suppliers, producers, processors and buyers, who are supported 
by a range of technical, business and financial service providers (USAID 2006). See figure 1 
below. 
 
Figure 1: Value chain illustration  
 
(Modified Sidahmed, 2010, p.3) 
 
input
•Feed
•Veterinary services
•Breeding
production
•Animal producers 
(herders and farmers) 
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•Slaughtering/processing
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•Transport
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marketing
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•Food service providers
•Restaurants
•Street vendors
•consumers
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2.6.2 Value Chain Actors  
A livestock value chain can be defined as the full range of activities required to bring a product 
(e.g. live animals, meat, milk, eggs, leather, fibre, manure) to final consumers passing through 
the different phases of production, processing and delivery (IFAD, 2006 pg 1). 
 
In Kenya, major actors in the livestock and red meat value chains include input suppliers 
(forage and feed producers), pastoral producers, livestock traders, ranch owners and managers, 
slaughterhouse workers, butcheries, supermarkets, processors, meat packers, exporters, 
veterinarians and community animal health workers and transportation providers. All of these 
actors play an important and different role in the value chain (USaid 2012). The milk value 
chain, meanwhile, is comprised of farmers, traders, processors, dairies, cooperatives, vendors, 
ministry of livestock, the Kenya Dairy Board and input suppliers (Kilimo Trust 2012). 
 
2.6.3 Occupational Risks in Value Chain  
“Most at risk of contracting a zoonosis are people in close contact with animals or animal 
products” (Love 2010, p.1). Studies in developing countries show high level of contamination 
of meat and milk products (ILRI 2011). Consumers, slaughterhouse workers, veterinarians 
have been highlighted as the groups most likely to be infected (Kioko 2012; Mcdermott et al. 
2013). 
 
2.6.4 Occupational Activities and Associated Risks 
Activites carried out by meat and milk value chain actors in Kenya include trading, transporting 
of animals and animal products processing, inspection and certification, distribution and 
marketing. Some other important activities include tanning, waste management in 
slaughterhouses, as well as meeting with the public institutions and departments responsible 
for food safety and animal health (Kilimo Trust 2012; AU-IBAR &NEPDP 2006). 
 
Many value chain actors lack information on zoonotic diseases, and their role in increasing or 
reducing spread (Kioko 2012; Kang’ethe 2008). A value chain creates a web network for 
contagious diseases - linking producers, actors and consumers and thus facilitating internal and 
external transmission of pathogens. The role of value chain actors is often overlooked, yet they 
can play an important role in disease prevention and risk management process. 
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Successful and sustained disease control strategies are contingent on identifying not only the 
disease agents and vectors, but also the actors, in this case, specifically value chain actors – 
which can contribute to successful and sustained intervention outcome (FAO 2011). 
Collaboration between institutions and actors dealing with zoonoses in meat and livestock 
value chain can help to reduce risks and vulnerability in case of a bioterrorism attack on animal 
product value chains (McDermott & Delia 2011; Noah et al. 2002). 
 
i) Trading and animal movement 
In many cases, although animals are checked and condemned by inspectors in markets, and 
farmers or traders are advised to take animals home since they cannot be traded in the market, 
animals are sold clandestinely and slaughtered. The meat from such slaughter is sold in 
ungazetted places, which are not accessible to veterinary and public health officials, and are 
often not inspected (FAO 2011) 
 
ii) Transport of animals and animal products 
Trade can result in the movement of sick animals from one region to another, which leads to 
the spreading of zoonotic diseases into new areas. Animal product can also be a means of 
disease transmission. Moved quickly over large areas, infected animals and animal products 
can lead to contamination of vehicles which then serve as a source of pathogens for new 
animals or cross-contamination of products subsequently transported. A study by Kioko 2012, 
found that value chain actors responsible for transport were the least informed as regards the 
risks of zoonoses, especially in beef value chains, even though they were equally exposed to 
diseases carried by animals in their undertaking of transport activities. Meanwhile, in the 
context of pastoralism, trekking can cause disease exposure to animals moved on foot, 
particularly where it involves passing over an area contaminated with zoonotic pathogens or a 
wild animal reservoir (Iowa state university 2007; OIE 2013; OIE 2012; WHO 2014; AU-
IBAR 2014a; WHO 2008a; AU-IBAR 2011). 
 
iii) Animal slaughter, inspection and processing 
There is a risk of zoonotic disease transmission and spread to human populations associated 
with slaughtering of sick animals and poor hygiene while handling animal products during 
preparation and processing. Unhygienic handling of beef at slaughter resulting from non-use 
of protective gear, unclean water and dirty working surfaces where animals are slaughtered, 
exposes products to high levels of contamination (Nsadha 2013). Abattoirs are often very 
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unhygienic, which is significant given that they are a very critical point in the value chain (ILRI 
2011). 
 
A study by Cook et al. (2013) of slaughterhouses in western Kenya found that hygiene was 
poor and that there was high prevalence of zoonotic diseases among workers. Similar results 
were observed by Pal et al. (2013) and a study focusing on Maragua, Kenya by Kioko (2012). 
 
iv) Retail and consumption of animal products  
In terms of retail and consumption of animal products, a study undertaken by ILRI in Nigeria 
highlighted risky practises as the selling of meat over a long period, retaining meat for sale the 
next day, tasting raw meat to test freshness where refrigeration facilities were not available, 
inadequate washing of surfaces and negligible use of disinfectants in working places. Evidence 
suggests that tuberculosis, brucellosis, leptospirosis, cystic echinococcosis, anthrax, Q fever 
and Rift Valley fever (RVF) infection is often high among individuals involved in meat and 
milk value chains (ILRI 2011; Roesell & Delia 2013). 
 
Animal products are abundant with micro-organisms which can be spread through 
consumption. Consumption of raw meat increases infection risk for both consumers and 
retailers who handle meat products. Cultural practices can increase or decrease chances of 
infection and identifying these practices and educating individuals aids disease reduction 
(Abunna et al. 2008). Food may be served poorly cooked due to customers being in a hurry, 
high demand may reduce attention to preparing food properly, and the fuel source available 
can also be insufficient in terms of generating the heat required to cook meat properly. In 
particular, there is a high risk of being served undercooked beef where it is consumed in 
drinking locales. Due to intoxication, consumers may not realise the risks associated with their 
consumption behaviour and as a consequence, it is a very common route of Taenia egg 
transmission and infection leading to human taeniasis (Nsadha 2013). 
 
v) Waste management in slaughterhouses 
Measures leading to an improvement in environmental waste management and a reduction in 
exposure of the human population to zoonotic diseases are important in slaughterhouses to curb 
spread of infection. In particular, wastewater from slaughterhouses poses a threat to the 
enviroment, leading to the contamination of water bodies (Abunna et al. 2008). 
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A study by Nsadha conducted in 2011 on cysticercosis in Uganda highlighted the fact that 
value chain actors’ perceptions are often poor when it comes to waste management due to lack 
of information or education on the risks of zoonoses transmission and spread associated with 
poor waste management. It revealed that only 12 % of respondents knew that pigs are infected 
by eating human faeces and only 16 % knew that humans are infected by eating infected pork 
(Nsadha 2013). This problem has also been highlighted in Ethiopia (Kurwijila et al. 2011; 
Abunna et al. 2008). 
 
2.6.5 Existing recommendations for biosecurity within value chains  
i)  Trading and animal movement 
There are some recommendations regarding animal movements. Some of the proposed 
measures include animals inspection at the market to ensure that only healthy animals are 
traded (Nsadha 2013). Sick animals should be treated and isolated, and if it is a very contagious 
disease they should be culled and destroyed. Quarantine and isolation of new animals in the 
market places or holding grounds should be practised. Governments should also put in place a 
mechanism to encourage value chain actors to report sick animals, and offer incentives or 
compensation for destroyed animals (FAO 2010b; Mayer 2000; FAO 2010c; FAO 2008a). 
 
ii) Transport of animals and animal products 
Transport operators should only move inspected meat products which have been certified as 
safe by a veterinary officer. Movement certificates for animals can be important to minimise 
spread of diseases. Vehicles transporting animals should be disinfected between use 
(Ngochembo 2011; Jabbar et al. 2011; USaid 2012). 
 
If used to transport infected animals or carcasses, a vehicle should subsequently be 
decontaminated according to laid down standards to eliminate pathogens transmission and 
spread, and avoid further exposure to other animals or humans from contaminated surfaces - 
some zoonosis like anthrax can persist for long periods of time in spore form. Protective gear 
should be used always when at work to reduce exposure (Battelli et al. 2006; Mayer 2000; FAO 
2010c; Kadigi et al. 2013). 
 
iii) Animal slaughter, inspection and processing 
Implementing simple biosecurity measures such as improving hygiene can greatly reduce 
transmission and spread of zoonotic diseases. Specifically, there is a need to improve meat 
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inspection and personal hygiene which is proven to reduce infection risk. Inadequate ante-
mortem inspection of animals and post-mortem meat inspection have been highlighted as a 
challenge that needs to be addressed (Kang’ethe et al. 2010; ILRI 2011; Roesell & Delia 2013; 
Abunna et al. 2008). 
 
Occupational biosecurity measures, such as wearing and use of protective gear, can reduce 
exposure of actors, including vets and abbatoir workers, to zoonotic diseases resulting from 
contact with animal fluids and tissues which often contain pathogens responsible for 
brucellosis, anthrax, leptospirosis and many others diseases (FAO 2011; DEFRA 2008; Iowa 
state university 2007; ILO 2009). 
 
iv) Retailing and consumption of animal products  
A study in Nigeria by ILRI showed that meat sellers had more diarrhoea symptoms and disease 
incidence than consumers of meat products, indicating that they are a group with high 
occupational risk. This should serve to incentivise or motivate behaviour change and also as a 
reason to embrace biosecurity and food safety measures (ILRI 2011). In particular, butchers 
could play a key role in implementing biosecurity measures to prevent zoonotic diseases in 
their work place related to handling meat. 
 
There is an important gender aspect to zoonoses transmission and spread as women are often 
more health conscious, have higher hygiene standard and engage in practices which reduce 
contamination and related risks. They typically have better hygiene standards than men when 
it comes to food handling; however, no gender studies have been done so far to understand the 
drivers between gender differences when it comes to issues about food safety (Delia 2011; ILRI 
2011). 
 
Proper hygiene at work places and simple measures such as keeping clean surfaces in the work 
enviroment can significantly reduce risks of contracting food-borne zoonotic diseases. Food 
safety laws should be developed that are easy to follow and incentives given to value chain 
actors for adoption. Communication should be enhanced between the authorities and value 
chain actors to improve information flow and, consequently, food safety (Battelli et al. 2006; 
FAO 2008a). 
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v)  Waste management in slaughterhouses 
Zoonoses are easily spread through water and food products (Dufour et al. 2012), while flies 
and scavengers feed on waste and then spread pathogens. Spores of anthrax can be spread by 
flies coming into contact with carcases (Battelli et al. 2006). Animal waste especially in 
sewerage has been shown to contain cysts which can be source of infection. Manure should be 
treated before use in farms or grazing lands as it can have a heavy load of infectious micro-
organisms like anthrax spores, cysts, Helminths eggs and bacteria (FAO 2008a). 
 
2.6.6 Policy Institutions and Legal Framework  
In most developing countries there is limited investment in veterinary and health services and 
weak operational and surveillance capacity as regards equipment and personnel (Mcdermott et 
al. 2013; Zinsstag et al. 2007). There is a need for investment to upgrade laboratory services 
essential for human and animal health. There is a lack of efficient diagnostic services for 
diseases like brucellosis and anthrax in public health laboratories, which often leads to 
misdiagnosis of disease (WHO 2010). Kenya, for example, has only six regional veterinary 
laboratories with capacity which is neither sufficient in terms of equipment and supplies 
(EAPHLN 2012). 
 
Most agricultural value chains are developing rapidly while the law governing their functioning 
are slow to change. More proactive policy-making is needed rather than having reactive laws 
and legislation after problems have already occurred (McDermott & Delia 2011). Most animal 
products escape inspection before consumption, especially if channelled through the informal 
markets. Food safety policies are not enforced in these markets despite their existence (Zyl et 
al. 2006) and actions are required to rectify lapses in laws and improve enforcement of food 
safety standards (Sidahmed 2010). In this context, it is important to understand that the risk 
drivers and communication flows to actors must be improved to influence behaviour change 
(ILRI 2011). 
 
Responsibility for quality control of animal products especially in informal markets lies with 
the owner of the animal or the individual responsible for slaughtering. Most value chain actors 
do not adhere to rules and regulations (Zyl et al. 2006) and most animal deaths are not reported 
(Kioko 2012). Institutional problems negatively impact on meat and milk value chains, and 
there is an urgent need to develop policies that support certification of actors, development of 
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low cost packaging equipment, training on biosecurity issues and public awareness creation on 
the dangers of consuming poorly handled food products of animal origin (Kilimo Trust 2012). 
 
There is a lack of awareness of laws which makes it hard for value chain actors to invest in 
biosecurity measures. In Kenya, milk value chain actors operating informally, for example, end 
up paying bribes to police officers or risk having their milk containers confiscated. In this 
context, income lost to bribery and fear of losses, however, could serve as an incentive to invest 
in biosecurity measures (Delia et al. 2010). 
 
Currently, the activities of some value chain actors, especially informal actors, are not 
recognised by policies and authorities, and as a consequence they are not able to access 
information and extension services (Delia et al. 2010). Institutional and policy constraints 
affect the livestock sector due to inadequate laws and few or absent institutions. Financing and 
inadequate investment in education and research are also been major constraints (FAO 2006b; 
Alila & Atieno 2006). 
 
There is lack of enforceable legislations for culling and destruction of infected animals which 
is very important to stop disease spread (FAO 2008a). The sale of infected and sick animal is 
a common phenomenon in Kenya, as farmers try to avoid losses and engage in so-called distress 
sales. Animal interaction in the market places if isolation and quarantine is not practised can 
lead to diseases in animals being traded for slaughter especially in holding grounds (Rich & 
Hamza 2013; Oloo 2014; Matete et al. 2014; Nsadha 2013). 
 
2.7 Milk and Meat Value Chains  
Over the last three decades, meat and milk consumption has risen steadily in developing 
countries, spurred on by increasing income, population growth and the development of a 
middle-class in many countries which have experienced rapid economic growth (FAO 2006b). 
 
Livestock value chains in developing countries are dominated by low-yielding local breeds 
adapted to the regions (FAO 2006b) and most trade is undertaken in informal markets, 
dominated by low-income groups such as pastoralists located near cities and small towns. 
Prices for animals and animal products are low and do not include costs of pasteurisation and 
packaging or biosecurity measures adoption (Leeuw et al. 2013). 
 
45 
 
Although there is a need, and huge potential to leverage both formal and informal value chains 
to improve food safety through implementation of biosecurity measures, informal value chains 
are of particular importance in developing countries such as Kenya, with most animal source 
food trade occurring in these markets (Delia 2013). 
 
Informal value chain activities provide employment opportunities and sale of animal products 
generate more income with low transaction costs. Consumers often prefer artisanal food 
products such as sour milk, and meat products such as nyama choma (roasted meat) which can 
increase their exposure to zoonosis (Delia 2013; Abunna et al. 2008; Schelling et al. 2007). 
 
In this context, it is stated that “these [informal] markets have both positive and negative 
impacts on health and livelihoods; new risk-based approaches are essential for understanding 
impacts and managing food safety; most risk is managed by value chains themselves and 
improvements in food safety must be owned by value chain actors and driven by incentives.” 
(Delia Grace 2011, p.1).  
 
2.7.1 An Overview of the Milk Value Chain in Kenya 
Informal trade accounts for 80% of milk consumed in Kenya, which is one of the countries 
with the strongest position in East Africa as regards to milk production and has one of the 
highest consumption of milk products in the region at 83.4 kg per person. One study cited a 
consumption of 100 litres litres/capita/annum (Agriterra 2012; Hooton & Omore 2007). The 
informal milk market is characterised by institutional failure and governance challenges such 
as corruption and insufficient regulation or enforcement of standards governing value chain 
actors’ behaviours and practices, especially in terms of food safety and hygiene (Kioko 2012; 
IGAD 2004; FAO 2006b; Kang’ethe et al. 2005; Delia 2013). 
  
46 
 
The milk value chain activities and processes can be summarised as shown in figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Milk value chain activities illustration (modified Kilimo Trust 2012) 
 
There are two distinct milk value chains in Kenya. The formal value chain, illustrated by figure 
2, is relatively small based on the total quantity of milk traded, and is formally regulated with 
quality standards being set by the Kenya Bureau of Standards and the Kenya Dairy Board. 
Although several large companies such as Kenya cooperative creameries and Brookside are 
engaged in milk processing, they operate below capacity due to competition from informal 
sector. 
 
The informal milk value chain (figure 3) is dominant and accounts for nearly 90% of all milk 
traded. It involves middlemen and hawkers on foot, with bikes and cars used for marketing 
purposes. It is very poorly regulated with little or no enforcement of standards. Most milk is 
sold raw and unpasteurised, often within 20 km of major towns (Namanda et al. 2009; Omore 
et al. 2002; Valk 2008; Delia et al. 2008). 
 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of milk value chain 
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Some traders in the informal value chain have poor hygiene and poor milk handling practices. 
There is often bulking of milk from different sources which increases the risk of cross 
contamination. Traders are not licensed and operate without adhering to any code of safety 
requirements. Most milk traded is produced in pastoral areas; however, there has been an 
increase in urban and peri-urban milk production (Omore et al. 1999; Kang’ethe et al. 2000). 
 
A study by Omore et al. (2002), found that most households consume milk boiled in tea (93 % 
of households), as fresh milk (59 %), cooked in porridge (47 %) and fermented (8 %). The 
practice of boiling milk reduces the risk of exposure. Studies have shown presence of milk 
related diseases in Kenya such as Brucella and bovine tuberculosis among the human 
population (Delia et al. 2008; Marcotty et al. 2009; Godfroid et al. 2013; AU-IBAR &NEPDP 
2006; Delia et al. 2010; Omore et al. 2002). 
 
The long distances covered by traders from source to point of sale take a lot of time and increase 
the likelihood of milk products having a high bacterial count. It is also a reflection of poor 
hygiene in milk handling. Future efforts on biosecurity and food safety should be geared 
towards improving milk quality through training, education and extension services promoting 
ideal handling practices. Appropriate infrastructure should also be provided like cooling plants, 
refrigeration and containers to improve milk safety and handling. Most studies have focused 
on farm level milk safety and hygiene and very few studies have tried to look at the value chain 
to see what improvements can be made to ensure only safe milk is traded (Omore et al. 2000; 
Kilimo Trust 2012). 
 
2.7.2  An Overview of the Livestock Value Chain in Kenya 
There is a robust beef value chain in Kenya with per capita consumption of 12 kg/annum 
(Agriterra 2012), however, data regarding its function is often unreliable due to cross-border 
trade and slaughtering by pastoralist of animals which are not inspected or recorded (Aklilu et 
al. 2013; Agriterra 2012; usaid 2013). Most animals are kept in arid and semi-arid regions of 
northern area of the country, especially by pastoral farmers (Goverment of Kenya 2008; AU-
IBAR &NEPDP 2006). 
 
Kenya has a meat deficit and it is estimated that about two million beef cattle enter the country 
annually from neighbouring countries (USaid 2012). Demand for meat products is projected to 
rise from 360 000 tonnes to 500,000 tonnes, while production will only increase from 323,000 
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tonnes to 435,000 tonnes. The overall deficit is therefore expected to increase from 37, 000 
tonnes to 50,000 tonnes over the same period. This will increase activities by value chain actors 
and movement of animal and animal products across the borders as shown in figure 4 below 
(Makokha et al. 2013; Goverment of Kenya 2008; agriterra 2012). 
 
Figure 4: Beef value chain animal movement routes in Kenya. 
 
(USaid 2012) 
 
Animals supplied to slaughterhouses in Nairobi originate from northern Kenya, Somalia, 
Ethiopia, Tanzania and Uganda. The meat value chain starts in the pastoral regions of northern 
Kenya and moves towards the city where consumption occurs (USaid 2012). “Major actors in 
the livestock and red meat value chains include input suppliers (forage producers), pastoral 
producers, livestock traders, ranch owners and managers, slaughterhouses, butcheries and 
processors, and meat packers and exporters and also veterinarians and community animal 
health workers, and transportation providers play important roles (USaid, 2012, p.3). 
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There is a need for market regulation of meat value chain actors, especially those engaged in 
the informal market, taking into consideration the poor hygiene standards of slaughterhouses 
(Kang’ethe et al. 2010). Several studies have shown that diseases like brucellosis, E coli, and 
Cryptosporidium are prevalent in the value chains. However detailed data on occupational 
hazards of slaughter workers and other actors are very few or non-existent in Kenya (Cook et 
al. 2013; Kimani et al. 2012; Kioko 2012; Delia et al. 2010; Kang’ethe 2008).   
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework 
This study is based on the below conceptual framework (see figure 5), with the presumption 
that a complex relationship of factors drives the prevalence of diseases in the value chain. 
 
Government policies have the highest influence over disease transmission and spread as all 
other factors are controlled by policy instruments and mechanisms. Public health and education 
is also a mandate of the government and its main aim is to safeguard the wellbeing of Kenya’s 
citizens. 
 
Changing climate and ecosystem services provision create another risk due to the emergence 
of new diseases or re-emergence of previously controlled diseases. Environmental health is 
also important as it plays a role in the transmissions of pathogens through water, air or even 
directly to humans and animals. 
 
Value chain actors and activities are controlled through laws and regulations enforced by 
various government institutions. The socio-economic status of actors and consumers also plays 
a role in decision making as the only measures adopted are those which are cost effective and 
sustainable in the economic point of view. 
 
Any lapse in enforcement of compulsory government mechanisms or in actors’ adherence to 
voluntary measures leads to introduction of pathogens in the value chain which lead to infection 
of those handling and also consuming dairy and meat products. The conceptual framework for 
this study is summarised graphically in the figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5: Conceptual framework outlining the research focus of the study 
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Chapter 4: Research and Methodology  
4.1 Study Area 
Figure 6: Map of Bura, Tana River County 
 
http://www.pwaniportal.com/images/Tana%20River%20County%20Map.jpg 
 
Bura Tana is a dry and arid area in Tana River County (Figure 6), where the majority of the 
population lives in the rural area, sparsely located in close proximity to the permanent river 
Tana. Bura Tana lacks basic infrastructure such as a good road network and sewerage system, 
and institutional and service coverage is low. Although water is abundant, most households do 
not have access to clean drinking water. The levels of education are low and most people are 
small-scale farmers or pastoralists or practice small-scale mixed-farming (OCHA 2013; 
Garissa county Goverment 2013). 
 
Agriculture is the most dominant economic activity, employing about 60% of the population 
and as much as 40 % of the population working in the livestock sector (Odhengo et al. 2012). 
The region is endowed with rich cultural diversity with many tribes co-existing in the area and 
practising different economic activities from farming and livestock keeping to fishing (Sentinel 
Project 2013). 
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The area in the Tana River basin is very rich in biodiversity, and wildlife moves freely in the 
extensive land area (Mounde & Mwongela 2012). There is significant livestock movement as 
a consequence of the activities of the pastoral population, which affects animal and human 
health, with zoonotic diseases resulting from this movement (Ogara et al. 2014). The last RVF 
outbreak in 2007 had a very drastic impact on the livelihood of people in the Tana River district. 
The ban on livestock and livestock product trade affected a lot of people and pushed many out 
of business. Livelihood impacts were also immense as pastoralists reliant on livestock for 
livelihood could not access markets and could not migrate when forage became scarce 
(Odhengo et al. 2012; AU-IBAR &NEPDP 2006; IFAD 2012b; Redcross 2012; Catley et al. 
2002; Lynch 2011). 
 
4.2 Research Design 
4.2.1 Desktop Research  
A systematic literature review was undertaken to identify existing gaps in research and 
knowledge. Key words (biosecurity, zoonoses, food security, phytosanitary measures) were 
used to identify peer reviewed journal papers, reports and working papers describing the 
current situation in Kenya and globally, regarding zoonoses risk and biosecurity. Much has 
been written and researched but not from a holistic point of view taking into account the entire 
value chain. The gaps were used in preparation of the research questions and the questionnaires 
used to collect data. 
 
4.2.2 Mixed Method Design and Data Collection 
This study used a mixed methods approach to research, drawing on the strengths of the 
different, yet complementary, qualitative and quantitative methods. Quantitative methods 
provide numerical data, whereas qualitative methods provide information which cannot be 
obtained through quantitative methods only. The strength of this approach is that it 
acknowledges and accepts diversity and complexity of the research setting, and enables diverse 
disciplines and methodologies to be merged to generate more relevant data and results that are 
acceptable across a broad spectrum of sciences (Creswell 2008; Brannen 2005; Driscoll et al. 
2007). 
 
The mixed approach allows for holistic tackling of societal problems and incoporates society 
as an active actor in process of identifying a solution and not as passive scientific subjects of a 
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study. The approach is gaining global acceptance in many scientific fields, and particularly, in 
multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary research (ACET Inc. 2013; Bazeley 2004). 
 
4.2.3 Qualitative Methods and Data Collection 
Qualitative methods used in this study included in-depth interviews, participatory mapping, 
market visits, observations and informal discussions. Informal discussions were done in this 
research with value chain actors and centered on gender roles, activities and what biosecurity 
measures are adopted to reduce infection.  
 
This study utilised discussions and in-depth interviews as they are useful in examining 
perceptions and experiences about practices and knowledge of diseases in order to understand 
their attitudes and behaviours towards managing disease risk and adopting biosecurity 
measures (Khan et al. 1991; Liefooghe et al. 1997; Mbowa et al. 2012). These discussions have 
been advocated as important in validating information (Khan et al. 1991); and are commoly 
utilised to bring actors together for discussion of their experiences related to the diseases of 
interest (Kitzinger 1995; Morgan & Spanish 1984).  
 
Participatory value chain mapping was undertaken and helped to identify value chain actors’ 
activities and adoption of biosecurity measures, and to study institutional and governance 
issues. As described by Schiffer (2008) it is an easy-to-use method, involving very minimal 
costs, enabling critical points of infection to be identified. It also facilitates visualisation of 
linkages, which is important in the context of intervention to reduce disease incidence and 
improve food safety and health by value chain actors (IFAD 2009). 
 
Identification of livestock value chain actors and their roles enabled risk drivers and constraints 
to improving food security to be identified. Different value chain actors are faced with different 
risks and hence biosecurity measures adopted also vary. Actors have a lot of knowledge in the 
area they operate and this can be harnessed to make policies that respond to the needs of the 
value chain (Schelling et al. 2007; Eregae 2003; Rich 2011; ILRI 2007). 
 
In-depth interviews were undertaken to gain insight into perception of common zoonotic 
diseases and control measures adopted to reduce infections. Key informants included 
regulatory institutions public health officers, human health practioners, and animal health 
officers working in the study area; as well as abattoir workers, transporters, traders, butchers 
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and milk vendors. Partcipants for interviews were selected based on their experience and 
knowledge of zoonosis, animal health, human health. Informal discussions were initiated to 
spur discussions regarding practices that influence zoonotic disease spread in work place and 
observance of biosecurity measures.  
 
Triangulation was used to validate the accuracy of information provided and ascertain its 
correctness (Borrego et al. 2009). Care was taken so as to include all value chain actors as those 
who are educated or trained tend to overshadow those less educated, as well as minority groups 
such as women who also play a major role in the meat and milk value chains. The method tried 
to identify the actors, their location, their function in the value chain, their relationship with 
each other, their characteristics (gender, age, education, training), what products were traded, 
geographical coverage etc. Similar approach for value chain study have been proposed by 
Lundy et al. (2008) and Lusby & Panlibuton (2004). 
 
Qualitative risk analysis  
This study used hazard analysis critical control points (HACCP) approach, to qualitatively 
analyse risk. This is a scientific and systematic approach to process (activities) control in a 
specific value chain (USDA 1997). The concept outlines steps and facilitates the development 
and maintenance of operating procedure and standards which ensure high-level sanitation and 
hygiene, and which could be applied by actors engaged in processing activities in the milk and 
meat value chains in Bura Tana. The HACCP concept is used for quality control through risk 
identification and management at value chain level (Noordhuizen & Frankena 1999), and 
focuses on identifying critical point of risks to minimise the resources needed for quality 
control (Unnevehr 2000). 
 
4.2.4 Quantitative Methods and Data Collection 
The quantitative method used was a household questionnaire to capture information from value 
chain actors, with the main emphasis being on knowledge, biosecurity practices with regard to 
zoonotic diseases like transmission, handling sick animals, animal products, constraints to 
adoption of these measures and incentives and impacts of adoption and non-adoption of 
biosecurity measures. Questions focused on selected biosecurity measures and knowledge of 
zoonotic diseases and their control, which were identified during literature review and 
questionnaire pre-testing exercises. 
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Before administration of the questionnaire, its contents and purpose were explained and 
consent obtained from participants. The questionnaire consisted of four parts. Section A 
focused on respondents’ details such as age, relationship to owner, experience and training etc. 
Section B consisted of questions specific to the particular value chain actor group.  It 
concentrated on occupational practices and sources of the animal products. Section C focused 
on knowledge of diseases, transmission, treatment seeking behaviour, access to information  
and also knowlegde of symptoms in both animals and humans. Part D examined occupational 
risk specific to the actors and use of protective equipments. The last part of the questionnare, 
Section E focused on perceptions of bioscurity and also attitudes toward possible biosecurity 
measures. The role of policies and institutions was also investigated. 
 
The questionnaire captured social, demographic and occupational data. Risk factors such as 
exposure duration, age, protective clothing, drug use and treatment seeking behaviour, previous 
zoonotic infection, knowledge, level of education and training, animal products handled 
(traded/slod by actor) were also investigated. Questionnaires were administered to value chain 
actors operating at different levels and responsible for carrying out different activities. Actors 
were identified with help of local elders, local authorities and ILRI researchers working in the 
area. Enumerators who were trained for the exercise helped administer the questionnaires in 
face-to-face interviews. Questionnaires included both open- and closed-ended questions. Refer 
to appendices i, ii, iii, iv, and v for copies of questionnaires.  
 
4.2.5 Sampling 
The sample of value chain actors was selected through non-probabilistic purposeful, 
convenience and snowball sampling methods. This resulted in 153 actors being reached (43 
traders, 56 milk vendors, 9 butchers, 10 slaughterhouse workers and 35 transporters). The 
choice of sampling method was due to a lack of proper records of actors and also due to the 
fact that some actors lived far from the markets/work places. These methods are commonly 
used to access populations that are difficult to reach, where there is no sampling frame 
available, and where probabilistic sampling is thus not possible. An opportunistic form of 
sampling, the method involved sampling when the actors were available. The sample size was 
flexible, however, all slaughterhouse workers and butchers in the area were sampled because 
of their small population (Ritchie & Lewis 2003; Jabbar et al. 2011; Berg 2001). 
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The snowballing technique is a purposive sampling procedure which Yin (2011) and  Marshall 
(1996) propose to be used to allow proper concentration and to avoid interruptions which has 
been shown to occur during the questionnaire administration if it would be undertaken during 
work hours. 
 
One of the limitations of non-probabilistic sampling is that it may not be representative (Patton 
& Cochran 2002) and may be prone to bias. This was overcome by targeting to interview the 
whole population of actors to ensure inclusion of as many actors as possible in the sample. 
Convenience and snowball sampling has been used in other studies related to neglected tropical 
zoonoses (Choffnes & Relman 2011) and willingness to pay for beef safety (Viegas2013).  
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Chapter 5: Milk and Meat Value Chains 
The number of animals traded in Kenya is high considering the relatively small size of the 
market (as shown in figures 7 and 8). Originating from Somalia, Ethiopia and counties in the 
north of Kenya where there are high rates of pastoralism (AU-IBAR &NEPDP 2006); and 
according to the area’s district veterinary officer approximately 200 cows, and 600 goats and 
sheep are traded weekly. Most of these animals are sold to markets and ranches in Mombasa 
and Garissa. From Mombasa, they are sold to ranchers for fattening and later sold for local 
markets or are exported to Middle East countries; while from Garissa, they are traded 
southwards to Nairobi and markets in the surrounding cities and towns.  
 
Figure 7: Livestock market 
 
 
Figure 8: Animal marking after sale, before transportation 
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Figure 9: Milk and meat value chain mapping 
     
 
Figure 10: Livestock and Market Activity Maps Notes 
     
 
From the mapping exercise, maps were developed for milk and livestock value chains in Bura 
Tana as shown in figures below. The maps show the relationship between actors and the 
interaction that happen along the value chain. The milk value chain (Figure 11) highlights the 
various activities, actors involved, and the physical locations where the activities take place. 
Figure 12 shows the meat value chain and details of the activities, actors and location of this 
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respectively.  Figure 13 shows the activities that take place in the slaughterhouse as they play 
a key role in food safety of the meat processed in this place. The various processes of 
slaughtering can have impact on safety of meat and hence keen analysis was done to identify 
risky areas. The livestock trade activity map is shown by  figure 14 while figure 15 shows milk 
trade activity map. 
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5.1 Value Chain Mapping 
Figure 11: Bura Milk Value Chain  
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Figure 12: Meat value chain 
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Figure 13: Slaughterhouse activity/process map that an animal goes through until it is 
sold as meat 
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Figure 14: Livestock trade activity map 
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Figure 15: Milk trade activity map 
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5.2 Actors and Institutions 
Actors involved in the milk and meat value chains in Kenya include livestock traders, butchers, 
milk traders, slaughterhouse workers and transporters. Private input providers supply breeding 
services, veterinary services, AI stock, feed, extension services, veterinary drugs, and financial 
services to these actors. 
 
Institutions which engage in the value chain include the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, 
the county council of Tana River, public health authorities and the livestock market authority. 
Other institutions participating include the county government of Tana River, financial 
institutions, non-governmental organisation, banking institutions, and ranches (Kilimo Trust 
2009). 
 
5.3 Demographics of the Study Sample 
Based on the above, the target population of this study were actors engaged in the meat and 
milk value chains in Bura Tana. To ensure a representative sample, actors were selected from 
a population of female and male adults (18 years of age and above) operating as livestock 
traders, slaughterhouse operators, transporters, butchers and milk traders. For the qualitative 
part of the study, food safety regulators - namely public health officials, veterinary inspectors 
and the livestock marketing authority - were included. In total, the study sampled 154 value 
chain actors. 
 
The results which will be presented in the following sections of this thesis were obtained 
through use of ‘Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices’ (KAPs) survey (figure 18), participatory 
work (figure 9 and 10), discussions, observations (figure 16) and key informant interviews 
(figure 17). 
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Figure 16: Visiting a butcher 
 
 
Figure 17: Interview with market chairman 
 
 
Figure 18: Interview with a transporter 
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The composition of the study sample is summarised in table 6 below. 
 
Table 6: Composition of study sample (Value chain actors) 
  Traders Butchers Transporters Slaughterhouse 
workers 
Milk 
traders 
Sample Size   43 9 35 10 57 
Gender 
percentages 
Male  95.3% 88.9 % 97.1%  100 % 7 % 
Female  4.7%  11.1%  2.9 % - 93 %  
Mean age   42.86 38.56 32.17 38.20 32.11 
 
As is evident from table 6, the livestock value chain is dominated by men, while the milk value 
chain is dominated by women. Women comprised only 37% of the overall study sample, due 
to the fact that, in the Bura Tana area, women are not widely represented in the value chains. 
 
5.3.1 Access to Education and Training 
Education levels are low in the value chain which comprises mainly informal value chain 
actors. The results of this study confirmed the findings of the National Coordinating Agency 
for Population and Development Kenya (2010), that, although the majority of actors have low 
level of education, some actors attain primary school education (Table 7). 
 
Table 7: Percentage levels of education of different stakeholders  
 Trader 
n=43 
 
Butchers 
n=9 
 
Transporters 
n=35 
 
Slaughterhouse 
workers 
n=10 
Milk 
traders 
n=57 
None 76.7 % 44.4% 40.0% 10% 87.7% 
primary 18.6% 33.3% 42.9% 50% 12.3% 
Secondary  4.7% 11.1% 17.1% 20% - 
Above secondary  - 11.1% - 10% - 
Adult education  - - - 10% - 
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Table 8: Percentage of level of training   
 
As evidenced by table 8, the majority of actors engaged in the milk and meat value chains have 
not received formal training to undertake the activities for which they are responsible. This 
may limit their perception of the severity of the biosecurity risks they face as a consequence of 
their workplace practices. Most actors are not trained in handling of food and animals, 
recognising disease symptoms, disease reporting, and are not informed in the use of personal 
protection equipment, food laws and regulations which can serve as very important biosecurity 
measures when well understood, adopted and implemented. 
 
5.3.2 Access to Information 
Most value chain actors (81% of traders, 78% of butchers and 54.4% of milk vendors) are 
reliant on government extension services as it is the only widely available form of service 
provision. As previously mentioned, there is little incentive for private extension service 
providers to operate in the area due to high transaction costs and poor infrastructure. Although 
accessible, government provided services, however, are often stretched, underfunded and as a 
consequence, fail to deliver the quality of service demanded and required by value chain actors. 
 
Access to information is a major problem facing value chain actors in Bura as there is low 
coverage as regards to radio signals for FM stations, which typically offer relevant and 
accessible information in local languages. Nevertheless, radio is still one of the most efficient 
means of information dissemination as it is more affordable compared to print media 
(newspapers) and television (Table 9). It is also the most time-effective means of information 
dissemination, as newspapers, for example, have to come from Garissa town, typically only 
arriving around midday with the 11am bus. 
 
 Traders  
n=43 
Butchers  
n=9  
Transporters 
n=35 
Slaughterhouse 
workers  
n=10 
Milk 
traders 
n=57 
Formal 2.3 % - - 10 % 1.8 % 
On job 
training 
16.3 % 44.44 % 28.6 % 70 % 7.0 % 
No training 81.4 % 55.6 % 71.4 % 20 % 91.2 % 
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Table 9: Percentage of stakeholders receiving information from different sources 
Source  Traders 
n=43 
Milk 
traders 
N=57 
Transporters  
n=35 
Butchers  
n=9 
Slaughterhouse 
workers  
n=10 
Public health 
inspector 
55.8 % 15.79 % 28.57 % 55.56 %  50 % 
Fellow traders 41.86 % 19.3 % 34.28 % 55.56 %  - 
TV/Radio 72.1 % 38.6 % 60 % 33.33 % 50 % 
Family member 9.3 % 24.57 % 17.14  22.22 % 70 % 
Market 
administrator 
16.28 % 7 % 5.71 % - - 
Newspaper/magazine - - 8.57 % - - 
 
In addition to the above mentioned sources, the most common means by which value chain 
actors obtain information is from public health inspectors (university educated) and fellow 
traders. Information is typically passed by word of mouth or in visual form, as most of actors 
cannot read due to their low education levels. There is a relationship characterised by trust 
between value chain actors and veterinary officers or public health inspectors as these service 
providers are often either from the local area or are government employees who have been 
working in the area for such a long period of time to the extent that they can even communicate 
to actors in their local language about relevant issues such as transmission and spread of 
zoonotic diseases. 
 
5.4 Knowledge of Zoonotic Diseases 
Knowledge of zoonotic diseases is very low among value chain actors in the Bura Tana region 
(table 10), and particularly so, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, among those most at risk due to 
their daily occupation activities. This study assessed knowledge according to a list of diseases 
that are either associated with close contact with animals and animal products or with the 
consumption of animal products. The main reason for selection of these diseases was that they 
tend to be confused with common diseases such as malaria due to similar symptoms. In addition 
these diseases also have high socio-economic implications for value chain actors and their 
dependants. 
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Table 10: Percentage of stakeholders with knowledge about zoonotic diseases 
 
There is high awareness of zoonotic diseases among livestock value chain actors (i.e. 
slaughterhouse workers and butchers). This can be explained by the fact that training 
programmes are regularly held and actors have close contact with veterinary officers and public 
health inspectors who visit their place of work on a daily basis. 
 
Knowledge among actors engaged in the milk value chain is significantly lower as shown in 
table 11. This is largely due to the fact that it is a value chain dominated by female actors, who 
typically have lower knowledge of zoonosis than their male counterparts, due to their 
comparatively limited contact with public health officials, as well as low levels of training and 
education. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Traders  
n=43 
Butchers 
n=9 
Transporter 
n=35 
Slaughterhouse 
workers  
n=10 
Milk 
traders 
n=57 
Heard zoonoses  72.1% 77.8 % 65.7 % 90 % 47.4 % 
Know 
biosecurity 
measures 
55.8 % 44.4 % 48.6 % 90 % 36.8 % 
Biosecurity 
important  
58.1 % 44.4 % 48.6 % 90 % 36.8 % 
Can get infected 
from livestock 
or livestock  
products  
72.1 % 66.7 % 60.0 % 90 % 36.8 % 
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Table 11: Percentage knowledge of specific zoonotic diseases  
 Traders 
n=43 
Transporters 
n=35 
Slaughterhouse 
workers  
n=10 
Butchers 
n=9 
Milk 
traders 
n=57 
Know 
Brucellosis  
67.4 57.1 70 44.4 36.8 
Know TB 60.5 40 90 44.4 40.4 
Know anthrax 27.9 45.7 90 44.4 19.3 
Know Rabies  46.5 42.9 80 55.6 33.3 
Know 
Salmonellosis 
41.9 40 30 44.4 31.6 
Know 
Cystercosis 
97.7 77.1 100 88.9 73.7 
Know RVF 88.4 71.4 90 66.7 40.4 
Know Q-fever  14 17.1 10 0 3.5 
Know 
Leptospirosis  
39.5 37.1 50 33.3 19.3 
 
Table 12: Local names for zoonotic diseases as mentioned by actors 
1 Anthrax Quut/Kut 
2 Ticks Shilin/Shilmi 
3 RVF Sandik 
4 Ringworm Chilmale/Chirmale 
5 Trypanasoma Ghandi/Gandi/Nagana 
6 Enterotoxaemia (sheep) Macdegesta 
7 Mange Duna 
8 Worms Gorian 
9 NCD Kideri 
10 Abortion Des 
11 Mastitis Andabarar 
12 Cough (wounds mouth) Kufur 
13 Diarrhoea Shuum 
14 Bloody urine Kathidiig 
15 Emaciation Aata/Aada/Upele 
16 Cough (nasal discharge) Dif 
17 PPR Madegerte 
18 Fever Xanda 
19 CBPP Somp/Somba/Sanap/Sambap/Berfur/Berful 
20 Foot and Mouth Diseases (FMD) Abep/Habep/ Habeb/Oyale 
21 Heart-Water Gidhir 
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22 LSD Furk/Furuq/Kukubi/Kuskus/QusQus - 
23 Black Quarter Bashasha 
24 CCPP Gesor/Gesdor/Gisdho 
 
Q fever, leptospirosis and salmonellosis were the least known diseases, despite the fact that 
these diseases and in particular, leptospirosis, have been identified by ILRI (2014 unpublished 
data) as having a very high seroprevalence in the area. Milk traders had the lower levels of 
knowledge of zoonotic diseases compared to other value chain actors, however, they did have 
significant knowledge of cysticercosis and RVF compared to other diseases of interest. 
 
5.4.1 Knowledge of the Symptoms of Zoonotic Diseases 
Value chain actors have a general understanding of how the symptoms of zoonotic diseases are 
manifested in humans and animals. In addition to fever, commonly mentioned symptoms for 
livestock include weakness, cough, diarrhoea, dull skin, mucous, cough, emaciation, difficulty 
in breathing, snoring, blood in mucus, abortion, expulsion of the foetus from the uterus 
(abortion).  
 
Value chain actors’ reported that knowledge stems from the fact that the market committee 
undertakes visual observation to identify symptomatic livestock and if an animal is found, a 
veterinarian is called. 
 
“The market committee calls a vet to inspect new animals that look suspicious….like a 
rough fur, coughing or with bad state of health. The veterinary officer can treat the 
animal and it is checked till healed or he can propose that the animal be taken home 
after treatment” 
- Market elder 
  
Slaughterhouse workers have higher knowledge of the symptoms of zoonotic diseases and the 
impact of parasites on livestock compared to other value chain actors, due to the fact that they 
encounter worms and cysts in their daily work. The pictures below show some of the parasites 
observed in slaughterhouse, in the course of this study (Figure 19-20). 
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Figure 19: Tape worms after slaughter 
 
 
Figure 20: Stilesia hepatica (a parasite) on a liver 
 
 
5.5 Impact of Zoonotic Diseases on Value Chain Actors 
Zoonotic diseases have social as well as economic impacts on value chain actors. This study 
investigated the number of times in a year that an actor was likely to fall ill due to disease 
contagion, the costs associated with treatment and the business losses resulting from their 
inability to work in the interim recovery period. Some actors do not lose much as their 
businesses are kept open and activities continued by spouses or employees, but some actors 
have no choice but to close business until they are treated and cured. 
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Table 13: Length of time of sickness due to disease infection 
 Percentage of those who 
have been sick the last 2 
weeks 
Percentage of those who 
have been sick the last 6 
months 
Slaughterhouse workers  
n=10 
10.0 % 60.0 % 
Transporters  
n=35 
25.7 % 31.4 % 
Milk traders 
 n=57 
22.8 % 38.6 % 
Traders 
 n=43 
20.9 % 44.2 % 
Butchers  
n=9 
22.2 % 11.1 % 
 
Table 13 indicates but does not quantify losses suffered as a consequence of likely zoonotic 
disease infection due to occupational risks, but it nevertheless highlights the fact that value 
chain actors often fall ill and therefore lose out on an opportunity to earn an income. Although 
daily profits earned are small, engagement by individuals in the milk or livestock value chain 
is one of the only means of income generation in the area, and therefore very important in 
sustaining household financial needs while also providing nutrition and food security. 
 
The economic costs associated with treatment and purchase of medicinal drugs is high for value 
chain actors, while loss of income also impacts on household livelihood security as money 
spent is diverted from covering costs of food to treatment. Some diseases have higher economic 
and social implications than others - for example, tuberculosis and brucellosis - as they take 
long to treat and therefore render those who are ordinarily ‘bread-winners’ in a household as 
dependants. 
 
The results of this study indicate that the value chain actors most impacted by zoonotic disease 
are slaughterhouse workers. This is due to the fact that they are paid per animal flayed or 
slaughtered and can earn improved amounts if the volumes of livestock processed on a given 
day is high. If they display symptoms of disease infection (zoonotic or no zoonotic), workers 
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are typically not allowed to engage in flaying and slaughtering activities by the slaughterhouse 
management. This is a requirement that they must abide by as set out in health and safety 
regulations and imposed by public health inspectors who are present on a daily basis. 
 
Table 14: Examples of economic losses associated with diseases 
 Slaughterhouse 
Workers 
 n=10 
Transporters  
n=35 
Milk traders  
n=57 
Traders 
n=43 
Butchers 
n=9 
Mean cost of 
treatment  
1402 
(465) 
898 
(273) 
599 
(133) 
860 
(178) 
537 
(289) 
Business loss 2027 
(511) 
1097 
(300) 
639.82  
(143) 
2019 
(1155) 
760 
(328) 
Mean income 
per day 
1465 
(751) 
1132 
 (309) 
337.02  
(85) 
3587 
(858) 
1344 
(524) 
Percentage of 
business closed 
when an actor 
is sick  
30.0% 31.4% 15.8% 18.6 % 11.1 
Mean times an 
actor is sick 
per year  
2 times  2 times 2 times 2 times 2 times 
Note: Means and standard deviations in brackets 
 
5.6 Perceptions of Risk posed by Zoonotic Diseases 
A review of the literature indicates that zoonosis are a major issue for the region, however, 
most value chain actors do not perceive zoonosis as a significant challenge to undertaking their 
activities. In many cases, value chain actors slaughter sick livestock due to the fact that they 
lack sufficient knowledge regarding zoonotic diseases. 
“....Some say our people have been eating meat for a long time, it never killed anyone, and 
will it start now? I don’t think so...” 
- Market elder 
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“.....If you observe the lifestyle people lead here, people are prone to that(diseases), because 
you find milk, in fact people tell you drink milk the moment you have milked, that is the best 
milk other than boiling it……………they immediately drink the milk, so it’s a challenge…...” 
- Health center clinician 
 
Islam is the vibrant religion in Bura Tana, and cultural and religious practice dictates that if an 
animal dies, its carcass is burnt or disposed by burying, or throwing it in the wild and covering 
it with twigs and branches - at a fundamental level, it is never consumed. In most cases, 
however, sick livestock are slaughtered before they die and therefore can still be consumed. 
Although it reduces losses, the practice significantly increases exposure of those who slaughter 
and those who consume to zoonoses. Religious belief influences risk perception as many value 
chain actors believe that God protects them from disease infection and hence, they do not need 
to take measures to protect themselves. 
 
“…..you become sick when you start thinking of these diseases in your mind. If you 
don’t believe about them, you can’t get sick! If you start thinking and accepting 
their existence, you will definitely get sick…our fathers have been drinking raw milk 
for ages…they have not died from the disease you are talking about...” 
- Market woman (selling milk) 
 
“The major problem is that most meat doesn’t cook properly and people will eat meat 
before it fully cooks, this may expose people to diseases because some parts of the meat 
don’t get to heat properly and the heat may not be sufficient to kill microorganisms.” 
- Public health inspector 
 
5.6.1 Attitudes and Perceptions towards Biosecurity Measures 
Value chain actors vary in their attitudes towards biosecurity and its importance as shown in 
table 15. The results of this study indicate that most value chain actors are willing to invest in 
biosecurity measures, although opinion is divided as to whether or not they can actually afford 
to implement such measures. There is widespread consensus among actors interested in 
preventing spread and transmission of zoonotic diseases, that biosecurity measures are 
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beneficial not only in the context of their health but also their business interests. In spite of 
their interest in biosecurity measures, the overwhelming majority of value chain actors say that 
they do not have the knowledge required to implement or adopt required measures. 
 
Meat, milk and livestock are important products for Bura Tana economy (see table 16 below), 
and in addition to pastoral communities - for whom production constitutes a source of nutrition, 
income and is of social and cultural value (symbol of wealth, dowry payments, mobile banking 
and savings) - engagement in the milk and meat value chains provides a source of employment 
for a large segment of the population. The close association which results as a consequence, 
between humans and animals, however, has a major downside. Value chain actors, who are 
engaged in occupations supported by livestock and livestock products, are at high risk of 
contracting zoonotic diseases which can have a devastating economic and social impact as 
previously outlined. 
 
The majority of value chain actors, for example, never use any personal protective equipment 
(PPE) to reduce the disease risks associated with their occupation. Those who use PPE, rarely 
use the correct or complete set of equipment advocated, and choose rather to use particular 
items primarily as a means of escaping or to some extent adhering to regulations. Knowledge 
plays a key role in influencing value chain actors’ adoption of biosecurity and other risk 
reduction measures. In the case of PPE use, the results of this study highlight the fact that value 
chain actors’ opinion is divided as to whether the practice is compulsory or voluntary. This is 
a significant finding given that, where biosecurity measures are regarded as compulsory, they 
are typically given greater importance. 
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Table 15: Percentage of actors agreeing with statements regarding biosecurity 
Attribute  Attribute level Milk traders 
n=57 
Traders 
n=43 
Butchers 
n=9 
Slaughterhouse 
workers 
n=10 
Transporters 
n=35 
Actor not willing to 
invest in biosecurity 
Agree  10.5 % 16.3 % 22.2 %  40 % 11.4 % 
Neither agree/disagree  22.8 % 9.3 % - 10 % 17.1 % 
Disagree  64.9 % 74.4 % 77.8 % 50 % 71.4  % 
Actor cannot afford to 
invest in biosecurity 
Agree 38.6 % 34.9 % 33.3 % 30 % 31.4  % 
Neither agree/disagree 17.5 % 14.0 % 22.2 % 10 % 20.0  % 
Disagree 42.1 % 51.2 % 44.4 % 60 % 48.6  % 
Actor have no interest in 
biosecurity 
Agree 8.8 % 14.0 % - 10 % 11.4 % 
Neither agree/disagree 19.3 % 16.3 % 22.2 % 20 % 20.0  % 
Disagree 70.2 % 69.8 % 77.8 % 70 % 68.6 % 
Actor don’t believe that 
biosecurity is beneficial 
Agree 8.8 % 4.7 % - 10 % 2.9  % 
Neither agree/disagree 21.1 % 14.0 % 22.2 % 10 % 17.1 % 
Disagree 68.4 % 81.4 % 77.8 % 80 % 80.0 % 
Lack of knowledge of 
biosecurity practices 
Agree 64.9 % 65.1 % 44.4 % 50 % 71.4 % 
Neither agree/disagree 12.3 % 20.9 % - - 17.1 % 
Disagree 19.3% 14.0 % 55.6 % 50 % 11.4 % 
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Table 16: Stakeholders’ perceptions of biosecurity, in percentage 
Attribute  Attribute level Milk 
traders 
Trader
s 
Butchers Slaughterhouse 
workers 
Transporters 
Meat/milk important source 
of income and nutrition  
Very Important  84.2 % 93% 100% 100 % 94.3 % 
Important 15.8 % 7.0% - - 5.7 % 
Not important  - - - - - 
Protective equipment 
important 
Very Important 35.1 % 30.2% 77.8 % 80 % 57.1 % 
Important 38.6 % 32.6% 22.2 % 20 % 25.7 % 
Not important 26.3 % 37.2% - - 17.1 % 
Training important Very Important 54.4 % 76.7% 55.6 % 90 % 77.1 % 
Important 35.1 % 23.3% 44.4 % 10 % 17.1 % 
Not important 10.5 % -  - 5.7 % 
Not use same vehicle  for 
meat/milk with other product 
Very Important 50.9 % 41.9% 77.8 % 60 % 60% 
Important 14 % 27.9% 22.2 % - 11.4%  
Not important 35.1 % 27.9% - 40 % 28.6 % 
Start day clean clothes Very Important 68.4 % 41.9% 88.9 % 90 % 62.9 % 
Important 29.8 % 39.5% 11.1 % 10 % 34.3 % 
Not important 1.8 % 18.6% - - 2.0 % 
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5.7 Biosecurity Practices 
Government agencies are responsible for controlling implementation of mandatory biosecurity 
measures and adherence to regulations, while adoption of biosecurity measures deemed 
voluntary is at the discretion of individual value chain actors. As outlined in the following 
section, however, adoption of both types of biosecurity measure is low in the Bura Tana region. 
 
5.7.1 Personal Biosecurity Measures 
i) Medical Examinations 
Most value chain actors have never had a medical check-up despite the fact that their 
occupations involve a level of risk and exposure to zoonoses. Few value chain actors present 
themselves for yearly medical examination. 
Livestock value chain actors handling food for human consumption such as meat and milk (e.g. 
slaughterhouse workers, milk traders and butchers) require a yearly check-up to obtain a license 
to work, (Kaitibie et al. 2010), and as a consequence, they constitute the majority of those at 
risk of zoonotic disease infection, who undergo a check-up. In the case of the milk value chain, 
adoption of this personal biosecurity measure is particularly low. Many milk value chain actors 
(e.g. 80% of milk traders) have never presented themselves for a check-up, despite the fact that 
they are mandated to do so by law (Table 17). 
 
Table 17: Percentage of value chain actors that undergo yearly medical examinations 
 Traders  
n=43 
Butchers  
n=9 
Milk 
traders 
n=57 
Slaughterhouse 
workers      n=10 
Transporters 
n=35 
Medical 
exams  
14 % 100  % 17.5 % 90  % 28.6  % 
 
Value chain actors, who fall sick, typically visit government health centres or private clinics as 
shown in table 19. Only a few of the actors get medical check-up (table 18), which means 
diseases are diagnosed at advanced stages sometimes. Some also elect, however, to self-treat 
(20 % of slaughterhouse workers, 16 % of traders and 14 % of transporters) the symptomatic 
manifestation of zoonotic diseases mentioned in table 20. Most value chain actors do not have 
access to medical care facilities (health centres are often located 30-50 km away), and as a 
consequence, are often not in a position to correctly identify the most appropriate choices of 
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treatment, based on diagnosis of a specific disease. Self-treatment is facilitated by ease of 
access to cheap over-the-counter medical drugs. 
 
Table 18: Most recent medical check-up, in percentage 
When did you last have a 
medical check-up? 
this 
year 
1 year 
ago 
2 years 
ago 
More than 2 
years ago 
never 
done it 
Slaughterhouse workers   
n=10 
80.0% 10.0% - - 10.0% 
Transporters  
n=35   
25.7% -- - - 74.3% 
Milk traders  
n=57 
12.3% 3.5% - - 84.2% 
Traders 
 n=43  
9.3% 4.7% - - 86.0% 
Butchers  
n=9 
77.8% 22.2% - - - 
 
 
Table 19: Places of medical treatment, in percentage 
Treatment place  Traders 
 n=43 
Milk 
traders 
n=57 
Transporters 
n=35 
Slaughterhouse  
workers 
 n=10 
Butchers  
n=9 
Health centre/clinic 60.47 % 64.9 % 48.57 % 60 % 66.7 % 
private hospital 20.93 % 21.05 % 37.14 % 30 % 11.1 % 
self-
medication/chemist 
16.28 % 14 % 14.29 % 20 % - 
Herbs 9.3 % - 2.86 % - 11.1 % 
Mombasa  
(Referral hospital) 
6.98 % - - 10 % - 
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Table 20: Zoonotic diseases symptoms mentioned
Trader 
bilharzia , chest pain, cold, cough, diarrhoea, flu cold, ear ache, stomach ache, flu, groin pain in head ache, 
pain in joints, malaria, pneumonia, bilharzia, muscle pain, pain in back, pain in joints, pain on left side of 
belly, pricked by thorn, severe back ache, stomach problem, stomach upset, weak ,typhoid 
Butchers flu, cold, malaria, pain in knees, tooth ache 
Slaughterhouse 
workers  
bilharzia flu ,malaria, typhoid, pain in joints, head ache, pimples on fingers 
Milk traders  
back ache, common cold, malaria, cough, fatigue, flu, head ache, stomach ache, pneumonia, typhoid, 
malaria, ulcers 
Transporters  
accident, chest problem, cold, cough, flu, diarrhoea, stomach ache, flu, head ache, shivering, Malaria , 
typhoid, vomiting, scorpion bite, stomach pain, head ache, typhoid, chest pain, weak 
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ii) Protective Personal Equipment (PPE) 
As evident from table 21, adoption and use by value chain actors of PPE as a personal 
biosecurity measure is low. Ground level observations highlighted the fact that, as previously 
mentioned, there is only partial use of protective gear and value chain actors often do not use 
the equipment available correctly or sufficiently (see figure 23). Although mentioned by many 
value chain actors as important to implement biosecurity measure (see table 16) with 89% of 
butchers and 90% of slaughterhouse workers saying they use PPE, the use of gloves was never 
observed in practice in the workplace although it was asserted as common practice by 70% of 
slaughterhouse workers and 14% of transporters. In the case of transporters, for example, the 
gloves used were more appropriate for riding motorcycles and not for handling livestock or 
animal products transported. 
 
Table 21: Use of Protective Personal Equipment (PPE), in percentage 
 Trader 
n=57 
Butchers  
n=9 
Milk 
traders 
n=57 
Slaughterhouse 
workers  
n=10 
Transporters 
n=35 
Use protective 
gear  
9.3 % 88.9 % 3.5 %  90 % 25.7 % 
 
 
Table 22: Percentage of livestock actors using different personal protective equipment 
 Traders  
n=43 
Milk 
traders 
n=56 
Transporters  
n=35 
Butchers  
n=9 
Slaughterhouse 
workers n=10 
Aprons and 
Overalls 
16.28 % 1.79 % 14.29 % 88.89 % 90 % 
Gumboots 6.98 % - 20 % 22.22 % 90 % 
Gloves 2.33 % - 14.29 % 11.11 % 70 % 
Head 
covering 
- - 5.7 % 22.22 % 70 % 
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In the case of the livestock value chain, although the majority of slaughterhouse workers said 
that they used protective clothes as required by law, on the ground observations; indicated 
otherwise, with little or no observed use of protective clothing (figure 21-22). Butchers, for 
example, are required to use coats and caps, however, none of the butchers observed were 
found to use these items of protective clothing during work hours; while slaughterhouse 
workers either had gumboots and no coats or wore coats but no gumboots. No slaughterhouse 
workers were observed to wear a cap during their work activities. 
 
Figure 21:Non-use of PPE by flayers 
      
 
Figure 22: Risky occupational activities undertaken without use of PPE 
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The results of this study indicate that use of PPE is low in Bura, and where it is utilised, this 
value chain actor behaviour is primarily driven by strict levels of inspection which leaves actors 
with no option but to adhere to laws and regulations. There is a need to sensitize and educate 
value chain actors on the risks involved in undertaking occupational activities to incentivise 
and facilitate behaviour change. An enabling environment must be established to improve 
actors’ access to information regarding correct usage and importance of PPE. 
 
At present, the use of PPE is determined first and foremost by the strictness of the institutional 
actor responsible for meat inspection 
“…. depends on who is in charge. If it is us they wear as required but if it’s with just 
other people they may be lenient and thus no strict dressing, I don’t know why they don’t 
like using protective clothing” 
- Veterinary officer 
iii) Personal Hygiene and Sanitation 
Value chain actors are slow to adopt personal biosecurity measures such as the use of toilets as 
it is a relatively new concept in a place where education and literacy levels are low. Open-air 
defecation is common; particularly in rural areas, where many households do not use latrines 
and instead defecate in the open, hidden behind prosopis bushes. This is significant given that 
these areas are typically also utilised as grazing grounds by pastoral communities, as well as 
the fact that close proximity to the homestead of scavenger animals such as dogs and chickens 
which can feed on human and animal faeces. In urban areas, although the situation is 
improving, few households currently have access to a latrine and as a consequence, open-air 
defecation is also common practice. 
“The uptake of hygiene is poor. Most people won’t even consider simple biosecurity 
measure like boiling drinking water to be important. When you tell people to boil water 
they will tell you that it loses taste and it’s just a waste of time. Some won’t even 
acknowledge that dirty water is source of some of the diseases. Some people share the 
drinking spots with animals and wildlife. This is the same places they use to bath and also 
wash their clothes. These pans are flooded with rainwater running during rainy season. 
The problem being it carries the waste with it to the pans and also microorganisms, 
Helminths cysts and eggs to the water pans. ”    
-Public health inspector  
87 
 
In Bura town, local authorities have not have undertaken the construction of waste water and 
sanitation facilities. In addition to the problem of open-air defecation, effluent waste water 
from slaughterhouse and other infrastructure spreads in the area when it rains, due to poor 
drainage and the flat profile of the landscape. Contaminating the environment by ending up in 
rivers and canals, these wastes also pollute the source of water which the urban population uses 
for cooking, cleaning and washing of clothing, given that the town has no piped water - thereby 
maintaining the chain of zoonotic disease infection (Sun et al. 2010). 
 
Figure 23: Dirty clothing of slaughterhouse workers 
        
 
5.7.2 Food Safety  
i) Animal Slaughter 
Livestock value chain actors commonly slaughter livestock which are sick, offering a number 
of different reasons for this (as outlined in the table 23 below), with consumption cited as the 
main reason. This is a dangerous practice; however, as it exposes value chain actors handling 
the products (i.e. slaughterhouse workers and butchers) and consumers to zoonotic diseases. 
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Table 23: Reasons for slaughter of sick animals 
Reasons for slaughtering sick animals  Percentage (n=43) 
To sell 2.3 % 
Ensure cultural beliefs 9.3 % 
To eat 48.8 % 
Ignorance 18.6 % 
To avoid costs associated with animal disposal 16.3 % 
 
The process of slaughtering of an animal typically takes place on the floor surface of a 
slaughterhouse, with partial flaying, before the carcass is hung as highlighted in figure 24 and 
25. This is partly due to the fact that slaughterhouse workers lack mechanical aids to enable 
them to lift the animal, but primarily a consequence of the fact that best-practice guidelines are 
not adhered to, and laws are not strictly enforced. Observations undertaken for the purpose of 
this study indicated that floor surfaces used are often dirty, with small pools of blood found on 
the floor, as well as pools of water used to clean animal offals such as intestines. This method 
of slaughtering facilitates cross-contamination as of animal products as pathogens responsible 
for zoonotic disease transmission and spread are likely present found on the floor. 
 
Figure 24: Non-hanging of an animal 
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Figure 25: Slaughter of an Animal 
 
 
ii) Mixing of Carcass and Intestines 
Best-practice dictates that intestines and meat are not mixed, as this reduces cross-
contamination. Observations undertaken for the purpose of this study indicated that animal 
stomachs are often put in the abdominal cavity after washing (shown in figure 26); and that 
washing practices are often inadequate in the context of eliminating the threat of cross-
contamination, with water used for cleaning occasionally be sourced from canals and untreated. 
Figure 26: Mixing of Carcass and Intestines 
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iii) Animal and Premises Inspection 
Animal inspection is the mandate of the county veterinary office in Bura Tana, while the county 
public health office is responsible for inspecting value chain actors’ premises. The public health 
office is also charged with issuing certificates of health to actors who are engaged in food 
processing and handling activities. 
 
Figure 27: Meat stamped post-inspection 
 
 
Meat inspection as shown in figure 27, is undertaken first and foremost by veterinary officers, 
however, occasionally also by public health officers when the veterinary department is 
overwhelmed by other tasks and duties. 
 
“For a cow the County charges 100 shillings for inspection plus 200 shillings for 
certificate of transport and for a sheep or goat 25 shillings inspection fee and 20 
shillings certificate of transport” 
- Public health officer 
 
iv) Testing and Quality Control of Milk 
In the case of the formal milk value chain, the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KBS) is responsible 
for the certification of milk, mandating dairy companies to carry out testing of samples for 
microbial contamination in batches of milk they receive. The KBS also occasionally collects 
milk samples to guarantee that expected standards are indeed satisfied by value chain actors to 
whom it issues a product certification mark. 
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Most value chain actors in Bura Tana participate in the resource-poor informal value chain. 
They do not engage in microbial testing as mandated by the KBS, but rather engage in a 
traditional form of testing - namely, taste testing (taking a sip of unboiled milk) to determine 
quality (table 24 and 25). This behaviour is highly risky and can lead to ingestion of disease-
causing pathogens. As a crude and low-cost, non-scientific method, it also fails to adequately 
test for microbial risks or anti-microbial residues which can be present in milk. Value chain 
actors do not have the resources to purchase necessary equipment or the knowledge to adopt 
more appropriate testing methods and as a consequence, the extent to which milk sold is in fact 
safe for human consumption is highly questionable. 
 
Table 24: Value chain actors’ performance of milk test 
Milk test performed Percent n=57 
Yes 96.5 % 
No 1.8 % 
 
Table 25: Specific milk characteristics tested 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v) Milk Storage 
Milk is most commonly preserved through a method of boiling and thereafter storage in closed 
containers, shown in table 26. Value chain actors typically operate at a small-scale, and for this 
reason have only limited access to capital, meaning that they cannot afford to invest in 
preservation equipment, cooling facilities or working premises large and safe enough to keep 
a fridge. 
Test  Percentage n=57 
Clot on boiling 12.3 % 
Colour 17.54 % 
Tasting ( taking a sip) 77.19 % 
Butter content  10.53 % 
Clot on boiling 19.3 % 
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Table 26: Method of milk storage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi) Meat Storage 
Meat is commonly preserved hung in the open air, and in most cases, is not protected from dust 
and flies which can be a source of contamination and pathogens causing diseases (table 27). 
Few value chain actors (22 % of butchers) have access to refrigeration facilities to ensure that 
meat is safe for human consumption. They regard the method as appropriate as shown in table 
28, due to the fact that it is cheap and easy to implement. Value chain actors fail to realise, 
however, that it leads to a deterioration of the quality of the product over time and that meat 
should rather be preserved and stored, for example, in a closed cabinet with a glass display and 
an air mesh structure facilitating air movement. 
 
Table 27: Meat preservation 
Meat storage/preservation  Percent  n=9 
Fridge 22.2 % 
Hung in open air 77.8 % 
Closed bucket 11.1 % 
 
 
Table 28: Value chain actors’ opinion of open-air meat preservation 
 
 
 
Method of storage Percent (n=57) 
kept boiled 73.68  % 
in closed container 59.65  % 
in open container 3.5  % 
Opinion of Hanging  Percent  n=9 
Very good 22.2 % 
Good 44.4 % 
Bad 33.3 % 
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vii) Food Packaging 
In Bura, food is often packaged in a sub-standard, unhygienic manner.  Milk value chain actors 
use recycled plastic bottles and mostly polythene-paper, to package and sell milk. Polythene-
paper are used often and are opened up through blowing of air which can facilitate a transfer 
of pathogens if the saliva or other mouth fluids of a value chain actor infected with a zoonotic 
diseases are blown inside(see table 29 below). Milk is sold to consumers in quantities according 
to desired container or cup size, drawn from storage containers which are never covered - 
meaning that flies, dust and other contaminants can enter - and which are, in most cases, also 
not aseptically cleaned. 
 
Table 29: Milk packaging 
Milk packaging  Percent   n=57 
Polythene-Paper packaging 73.7 % 
Plastic Bottles/Containers 56.1 % 
 
Meat is sold wrapped in old newspapers or a combination of newspapers and polythene as 
shown in table 30 below. When only newspaper is used, the meat may be contaminated as these 
are newspapers which have been read and could therefore, potentially have been handled with 
dirty hands. 
 
Table 30: Meat packaging 
Meat Packaging Percent   n=9 
Newspapers only 22.2 % 
Newspapers + polythene 66.7 % 
Meat is typically transported from slaughterhouse to butcheries in metallic meat boxes or 
plastic buckets stacked on a hand-pulled cart as shown in table 31 and 32. These containers 
should be registered and approved by the public health department. In reality, however, value 
chain actors do not always take steps to renew registration after the period of validity expires. 
Meat boxes which have leakages release blood into the environment, contributing to the spread 
of zoonotic disease-causing pathogens. 
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Table 31: Packaging of meat carcass for transport 
Meat Carcass Packaging Percent n=9 
Transport in meat box 77.8 % 
Buckets 11.1 % 
 
Table 32: Transport of carcass from slaughterhouse to butchery 
 Percent  n=9 
Closed vehicle 11.1 % 
Bicycle 11.1 % 
Mkokoteni/handcart 77.8 % 
 
Packaging materials are often not properly disposed of, and as a consequence, contribute to 
environmental pollution, while serving also to transmit pathogens where there is contact with 
water or disease vectors such as flies. In addition, they can be eaten by scavengers rummaging 
through garbage dumps, which facilitate continued zoonotic disease spread. 
 
viii) Use of Untreated Water 
Water used in slaughterhouse is typically supplied by the Bura Tana county council, however, 
Lorries transporting water are occasionally late to deliver, which results in water storage tanks 
running dry, forcing slaughterhouse workers to buy water from street vendors shown in figure 
28. Obtaining treated water is a major challenge for livestock value chain actors, as water is 
supplied by vendors in plastic containers and often sourced from irrigation canals, meaning 
that it is poses a risk to workers health and contributes to food contamination. 
 
Although untreated river water is priced cheaper than treated water, at Ksh 30 and Ksh 40 
respectively, it can be argued that failure to use treated water is not a case of lack of resources 
but rather a sociocultural practice and problem. Few value chain actors boil or treat water 
purchased using available purification agents such as water guard and pur, and use plastic 
buckets retrieve to water from the storage tanks. 
 
Ideally, slaughterhouse and other premises utilised for livestock value chain activities should 
have access to piped tap water; however, continuous access to treated water is currently only 
the privilege of government institution, offices and certain living quarters. As previously 
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mentioned, this is also the case as regards access to a sewerage system and to waste disposal 
facilities. 
 
Figure 28: Delivery of river water when water tank ran dry 
 
 
5.7.3 Animal Health Biosecurity 
i) Testing and Culling 
In times of zoonotic disease outbreak, the government imposes bans on the trade of livestock 
to curb spread and transmission, and enforcing a period of quarantine such that no animal can 
be moved to or from an area until a given disease outbreak is contained. There is no policy 
which compels or incentivises farmers to cull sick livestock, however, despite the fact that in 
the case of diseases such as brucellosis which cannot be treated; it is an essential part of any 
comprehensive solution to reducing disease transmission. There is also no programme in place 
to ensure that farmers are adequately compensated or helped to recover from losses associated 
with culling of their herds. 
 
ii) Animal Movement Certificates 
The county veterinary officer has a mandate to issue animal movement certificates, however, 
animal movement often goes undocumented and is largely unregulated. For pastoralists, animal 
trekking has social and cultural importance, and as a consequence, they rarely apply for 
certification, or adhere to guidelines regarding movement and restrictions imposed, for 
example, during periods of zoonotic disease outbreak. 
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Animal movement is equally important for traders who buy and sell in other areas. Similar to 
pastoralists, they often choose not to apply for certificates, viewing it as a lengthy process given 
that livestock have to be checked before the relevant documents are issued; arguing that it is 
not worth incurring the additional costs as regardless of whether or not they are in possession 
of required animal movement certificates, they still frequently have to pay a bribes to 
policemen to pass roadblocks. Many traders nevertheless acknowledge that animal movement 
facilitates the spread and transmission of zoonotic diseases to areas which are disease-free, 
citing the example of a perceived new tick-borne disease currently being spread through animal 
trade. 
 
“…….the tick bites the animal on the ears or below the horn or on the back …..and the 
animals starts to shake….in a day or two the animal is too weak to even move….we used 
to hear about the problem from people who came from Ijara ,masalani and Somalia…..now 
it’s a new problem here ……the disease is called Gaarbaat ” 
- Market elder 
 
iii) Prevention of Zoonotic Disease Spread and Transmission during Animal Movement 
In transporting livestock between different areas, traders adopt a number of measures to 
minimise spread and transmission of zoonotic disease, as well as respond to incidences where 
infection occurs as shown by table 33. These measures range from temporary measures such 
as isolation (i.e. separation between sick and healthy livestock until the risk of disease infection 
within a group has been eliminated) to more long-term measures such as quarantine (i.e. a 
complete freeze of animal movement which is supported and enforced by government 
agencies). 
 
Table 33: Practices to prevent spread and transmission of zoonotic disease 
Traders  Percent  n=43 
Burn 25.6  % 
Bury 16.3 % 
report to vet 2.3  % 
Slaughter 9.3  % 
Dispose off 46.5  % 
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iv) Response to Animal Death 
Most livestock slaughtered are apparently healthy, although some may be sick but 
asymptomatic during inspection, however, when an animal dies as a consequence of its 
zoonotic disease or unknown causes, traders respond to the situation as outlined in the table 34. 
 
Table 34: Common animal biosecurity measures practised by livestock traders 
Animal biosecurity practised Percent n=43 
Spray livestock for vectors control 86.0% 
Inspect animals 53.5% 
Isolate animals 55.8% 
Quarantine animals  39.5% 
report dead 34.9% 
 
The mean isolation days of newly purchased livestock was reported to be 3.77 days with a 
standard deviation of 10.7. This may not be sufficient given the longer incubation period for 
some diseases and the unregulated livestock interactions in market places during trading. 
 
Although animal deaths should be reported by value chain actors, few traders inform the 
relevant authorities when an animal dies as a consequence of disease as highlighted in table 34. 
The practice of non-reporting significantly hampers early detection of infection within a group 
of livestock and undermines Government-led responses to zoonotic disease outbreaks, as an 
increase in animal deaths can go unnoticed and an investigation in the aftermath of an outbreak 
is not initiated to establish a cause of death. 
 
5.7.4 Environmental biosecurity 
i) Hygiene and Sanitation in the Workplace 
Many milk and meat value chain actors in Bura Tana do not operate to high standards of 
hygiene as shown by figure 31, arguing that they are not in a position to maintain their premises 
and improve standards due to the fact that they lack access to running water. The public health 
department which is responsible for inspecting facilities and equipment used, as well as the 
county council which owns many of the premises, however, also bear significant responsibility 
for the current situation. 
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As previously mentioned, many slaughterhouse and butcheries do not have refrigeration 
facilities to store meat which is instead hung in the open air (figure 29), unprotected from 
contamination. Observations made for the purpose of this study indicated that premises are 
often dirty (figure 29 and 30) - with walls not regularly painted to maintain a clean look, as 
well as equipment and surfaces used for flaying and slaughtering activities (chopping boards, 
knives, tables etc.) also not thoroughly scrubbed and disinfected. 
 
Similarly, traders responsible for selling milk do not store or handle it in a hygienic manner; 
with containers are typically littered everywhere, boiling pots are not properly cleaned (water 
is swirled inside after use), and milk is not always stored in food-grade plastic containers or 
typically covered to prevent contamination with dust (see figure 31). 
 
Some value chain actors chew miraa (khat) in their workplaces - a behaviour which can 
significantly increase their exposure to zoonotic diseases if they forget to clean their hands after 
handling livestock or working in dirty conditions, and resume miraa chewing activity after 
occupational activity. As miraa is a drug; it can also potentially impair value chain actors’ 
judgment, leading them to take risks or forget to implement biosecurity measures. 
 
Figure 29: Poor hygiene standards 
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Figure 30: Intestine cleaning table in a slaughterhouse 
 
 
Figure 31: Unhygienic handling of milk and milk containers 
      
 
ii) Scavenger Animals 
As previously outlined, animals scavenging on wastes (solids and effluent) from 
slaughterhouse can serve to spread disease to other animals as well as humans with whom they 
interact, and through their faeces. Figure 32 shows observations made for the purpose of this 
study and indicated that chickens often feed on intestine wastes, while dogs feed on skin and 
other animal parts thrown away, such as the shanks of cattle slaughtered. Dogs found in the 
vicinity of slaughterhouse are also not commonly vaccinated against rabies and could 
contribute to its spread in the case of an outbreak. 
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Figure 32: Slaughterhouse waste scavengers in Bura 
      
 
Proper management of both scavenging animals and waste disposal is needed in Bura to avoid 
future problems associated with contamination of the environment and in particular, water 
sources; as well as zoonotic disease spread and transmission. 
 
iii) Waste Management 
Waste management is a major problem in Bura - a town which is rapidly growing, in spite of 
a lack of adequate infrastructure including a piped water distribution system and sewerage 
system. The town also lacks designated dump sites for animal waste products. 
 
“Dead animals at the market are not slaughtered but disposed by county council under 
supervision of public health department.” - Veterinary officer 
 
Observations undertaken for the purpose of this thesis (Figures 33, 34 and 35) indicated that 
the two septic pits of the slaughterhouse in Bura were both full, meaning that there was no 
appropriate place to dump wastes. Only wastewater effluent is directed to the pits; solid waste 
is often simply dumped outside the slaughterhouse. Dumping of solid wastes in the open 
exposes the local population to zoonotic diseases, given that it increases the likelihood of water 
bodies, such as canals - on which households typically rely for household activities - becoming 
contaminated with pathogens. 
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Figure 33: Slaughtering in the open 
      
 
Figure 34: Open dumping by slaughterhouse workers of intestinal contents 
  
 
Figure 35: Blood, shanks and intestinal wastes outside the slaughterhouse 
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5.8 Policy Environment 
Value chain actors have low knowledge of biosecurity laws (as shown by table 36) and many 
cannot differentiate between voluntary and compulsory biosecurity measures set out by 
industry regulations as shown by table 35 below. As already outlined, although use of PPE and 
personal medical tests for those handling food are compulsory by law, adoption of biosecurity 
measures by value chain actors is often low, with many viewing measures as voluntary as 
opposed to compulsory. 
 
Table 35: Knowledge of Compulsory vs. Voluntary Measures 
 
 
 
 Milk 
traders  
n=57 
Transporters  
n=35 
Traders  
n=43 
Butchers  
n=9 
Slaughterhouse 
workers 
n=10 
Biosecurity 
measure  
Percent of 
Compulsory 
response  
Percent of 
Compulsory 
response 
Percent of 
Compulsory 
response 
Percent of 
Compulsory 
response 
Percent of 
Compulsory 
response 
Meat 
inspection 
61.4 % 74.3 % 88.4 % 100 % 100.0  % 
Protective 
clothing 
35.1  % 54.3 % 46.5  % 100 % 90.0 % 
Business 
licence 
29.8  % 51.4 % 67.4  % 100 % 100 % 
Medical 
check-up 
29.8  % 51.4 % 34.9 % 88.9 % 90 % 
Handling 
training 
31.6  % 42.9 % 39.5 % 66.7 % 50  % 
Proper 
waste 
disposal 
38.6  % 51.4 % 62.8 % 100 % 80 % 
Proper 
meat 
storage 
70.2  % 71.4 % 76.7 % 100 % 80 % 
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Note: The table shows percentage that thinks the means the measures are compulsory while 
the remaining percentage deem the measures as voluntary. 
 
Many value chain actors view biosecurity laws as “foreign” (they don’t understand them 
highlighted in table 36), arguing that they were not consulted in the process of developing 
national laws or county council by-laws. They regard biosecurity laws as oppressive and in 
some cases, even exploitative - in particular, due to high levels of corruption involved in the 
enforcement of laws by the relevant authorities. 
 
Table 36: Knowledge of Standards  
 Milk 
traders 
n=57 
Transporters 
n=35 
Traders 
n=43 
Butchers 
n=9 
Slaughterhouse 
workers 
n=10 
Know health 
standards  
22.8  % 34.3  % - 88.9  % 100.0  % 
Understand 
standards  
10 % 22.9  % 51.2  % 66.7  % 100.0  % 
Have operating 
licence  
0 17.1  % 25.6  % 100  % 100.0  % 
Have Single 
business certificate 
0 - - 77.8  %  
Public health 
certificate 
0 - 11.6  % 88.9  % 90.0  % 
Animal movement 
permit 
N/A 5.7  % 9.3  % -  
Licenced 
meat 
carrier 
42.1  % 48.6 % 58.1 % 88.9 % 100.0  % 
Premise 
inspection 
certificate 
29.8  % 45.7 % 65.1 % 88.9 % 100.0  % 
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Personal medical 
certificate  
0 -  77.8 %  
County council 
permit 
0 - 14.0  % -  
Stock trading 
licence 
N/A 2.9 (1) - - - 
 
The establishment of a market committee following consultations with the livestock market 
authority (LMA) is frequently cited as an example of where engagement in the design and 
implementation of laws, has proven to be successful in terms of improving the situation for 
value chain actors. 
 
“The market is watched by market committee which supervises the activities from 
preventing stolen animals being sold in the market and preventing stealing from big traders 
who come from other areas to buy animals in this market.” 
 
“…the market committee calls a vet to inspect new animals that look suspicious….like a 
rough fur, coughing or with bad state of health. The veterinary officer can treat the animal 
and it is checked till healed or he can propose that the animal be taken home after 
treatment….” 
 
“If an animal dies in the market, it’s the duty of market to see it’s disposed by either burning 
using paraffin (sometimes with a tire) bury in a pit……” 
- Livestock market chairman 
 
i) Institutional Capacity 
Low acceptability and adoption by value chain actors of biosecurity measures is due to the fact 
that there is low enforcement of biosecurity laws in Bura by the responsible institutions, many 
of which are understaffed and therefore, overstretched - meaning that dissemination of 
information as regards the importance of laws for the milk and livestock industry is also low. 
 
Institutional capacity is limited in key institutions and departments tasked with public health 
and sanitation, despite the fact that an increasing number of functions have been decentralised 
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and devolved to county governments. Bureaucracy is nevertheless still entrenched and it takes 
a long time to get budgets approved, which also affects public sector service delivery and in 
the case of zoonotic disease spread and transmission, the enforcement of biosecurity laws. 
 
Funding devoted to certain sectorial causes and personnel has risen - for example, in the context 
of the health sector, but changes have not yet occurred in the context of the livestock and 
veterinary sector.  
 
“the county government is trying because …….Just recently there are new additions like 
we just got 4 new clinicians nurses and the lab got 1 more new person so I see its slowly 
improving, although there is still a long way to go.” 
- Health center clinician 
 
Although there are NGOs working in Bura Tana to provide services to local population, none 
are taking action specifically to curb the transmission and spread of zoonotic diseases, or 
provide socio-economic assistance to those impacted on by the diseases considered by this 
study. 
 
ii) Lack of Trust 
The milk market is not regulated meaning that there is easy entry to the milk market and a 
vendor can join or leave on their own terms, given that no formal structure exists. It limits the 
incentive for seasonal traders to invest in biosecurity measures. As market women typically 
operate on a road reserve, the county council in reality has limited capacity to enforce existing 
biosecurity laws, and this is further undermined by the fact that there is a very limited level of 
trust between milk traders and the authorities. 
 
Many women milk traders express their fears that the authorities will close down their 
businesses or make it harder for them to undertake transactions, while others complain of being 
exploited in the past by individuals who promised, for example, that they would purchase PPE 
on their behalf, but instead disappeared with the money received (contributions from milk 
women) and did not provide agreed-upon items. 
 
 
106 
 
“Most of the women don’t own trading licences, medical certificates or even milk 
movement certificates which are mandatory under law in such business. …….very few 
women, maybe one or two know about the existence of such laws…and even those who 
know about them don’t follow them…..” 
- Milk women market chairlady 
  
iii) Corruption 
Although the level of corruption and harassment experienced by value chain actors in the past 
has significantly decreased in recent years compared to the early 2000s - during Kenya’s so-
called ‘Milk Wars’, for example, when many milk value chain actors had their milk and 
equipment confiscated due to so-called policy changes favouring big dairy and milk companies 
- as previously mentioned, there are nevertheless still incidences of bribes being demanded by 
policemen manning roadblocks in exchange for issuance of milk and animal movement 
certificate, and animal inspection certificates. 
 
Value chain actors are often reluctant to report requests for bribes, illegally-imposed fines and 
harassment by government officials tasked with enforcing laws and regulations, due to fear of 
victimisation. Some actors reported succumbing to payment of bribes to be allowed to operate 
- in particular, transporters operating without milk or animal movement certificates. Rent-
seeking by powerful individuals in institutions still affect many value chain actors, with some 
women reporting that they have failed to get space in the new market to trade. 
 
Corruption makes it hard to enforce basic yet critically important biosecurity measures aimed 
at curbing zoonotic disease spread and transmission. Government institutions are the main 
providers of extension and health services, and are stretched in terms of available funding and 
personnel. This significantly affects health service provision, and there are many documented 
cases of unscrupulous doctors and clinicians taking advantage of situations to make money. 
 
“ With our Manyatta (private medical practitioners) case most of the people around here, 
even you right now for example as ok as you are, if you visit the Manyatta you’ll test positive 
for something e.g. malaria so that if they give you medication its about 2000 Kenya 
shillings…Yes they’re doing it for the money, so you find that a patient gets a lot of 
ineffective injections so the patient eventually decided it was unfair let them see a doctor 
and they came to me and looking at the treatment she had gotten and I decided to test her 
107 
 
for everything including brucellosis, because had it been typhoid all that treatment she had 
been getting would have worked. So the results for brucellosis were positive and we started 
her on treatment” 
- Health center clinician 
 
Chronic underfunding of key agencies and institutions responsible for human and animal health 
results in misdiagnosis and prescription of incorrect treatments for value chain actors and the 
local population presenting themselves to clinics, as patients with zoonotic disease infection 
often display similar symptoms not uncommon to malaria and typhoid. 
 
“…here we’ve gotten a case of brucellosis, she came in after being diagnosed for quite a 
long period, she was given antibiotics and she wasn’t responding for weeks, and brucellosis 
being similar to typhoid this seems to happen a lot. We were able to give her treatment and 
after a week she was responsive. There was also another case of misdiagnosis where the 
patient kept going for typhoid treatment for three months so even I have become 
increasingly alarmed” 
- Health center clinician 
 
Many institutional actors claim that bureaucracy and corruption are undermining any bid to 
curb zoonotic disease spread and transmission. 
 
“The county government now takes a lot of time to respond to a lot of the problems that we 
face. You find that when you complain, like now this year were in the tenth month, that’s 
the fourth month in the government calendar, and we haven’t received anything in terms of 
facilities and its almost the end of the first quarter and we haven’t received any funds, so 
you can imagine how we survive!” 
 
“So how do you survive?........This facility we are in the level of a hospital so we have that 
in cost sharing fund so we sit down, we budget whatever little we have and we go buy those 
things that are needy although in the real sense were not supposed to do that but now for 
the best, for the benefit of our patients and since there is a delay we are forced to do that. 
- Health center clinician 
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Late approval of budgets makes it hard to ensure that medical drugs are in stock for humans 
and animals at critical times when they are most needed, such as in the aftermath of a zoonotic 
disease outbreak. 
  
“Most of our facilities now lack lab personnel so they treat more using clinical symptoms. 
It’s really difficult to diagnose patients for example for brucellosis ……...one has to have 
been treated for malaria several times before making the diagnosis.” 
 
“all these times in our hospital am the only clinician and I am everything, the clinician the 
administrator, the clinical officer, the MOH, you’re everything to the hospital so you find 
in terms of service it’s like you’re not giving as much, you’re overwhelmed,” 
         Health center clinician 
 
iv) Poor Health-Seeking Behaviour - Behavioural and Social-Cultural Practices 
Lack of extension, public health training and education provision, due to staff shortages and 
sometimes transport means, is a key determinant of poor health seeking behaviour of value 
chain actors. Women actors, in particular, are often unable to read written information on 
biosecurity measures or zoonotic diseases and have no choice but to rely on word of mouth in 
terms of becoming informed of important issues. 
 
“…..I have been slaughtering for over 30 years ….I have never been infected with any 
disease…use of gloves and gloves …is just a lot of work for nothing” 
 
“……the disease we fear is chirmale because you can get infected by a small cut 
…especially when slaughtering……but we know how to avoid it……we tie some barks of a 
local shrub around the wrist …if you cut yourself…you don’t go to the hospital….you wait 
till the boil is ripe and ruptures …..Then after there you can go to the hospital……..if you 
go to the hospital and they inject you …..You will die ….” 
- Slaughterhouse flayer 
 
Many value chain actors, and a large proportion of the local population, consume raw offals 
and unboiled milk. Muslims do not consume blood; however, it is a common phenomenon 
among the Oromo and other pastoral groups in the Bura Tana area. 
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“Local people still slaughter sick animals because they lack knowledge. Some will say our 
people have been eating meat for a long time, it never killed anyone...will it start now? I 
don’t think so…..” however due to the dominant Muslim culture most people won’t eat 
dead animals but will instead burn the carcass. Sick animals are slaughtered before they 
die and then cooked and eaten.. The major problem is that most meat doesn’t cook properly 
and people will eat meat before it fully cooks, especially roasted meat, this may expose 
people to diseases because some parts of the meat don’t get to heat properly and the heat 
may not be sufficient to kill microorganisms.” 
- Public health officer 
 
Value chain actors often do not boil or treat water, and it is common even in hotels and 
butcheries to find untreated water being used to clean utensils used by patrons eating in places 
where food is handled and consumed. 
 
Although value chain actors are at risk in their day to day work, most do not undergo regular 
medical check-ups or if infected and experiencing zoonotic disease symptoms, seek medical 
attention on time. Low knowledge of diseases influences health seeking attitudes in the Bura 
area, while poor access to infrastructure such as health centres which are often far away and 
difficult to reach also means that cases of sickness may remain undetected or untreated until 
late. 
 
“Our people don’t look for treatment until it’s too late sometimes. The hospitals are far 
away from our places.” 
- Market elder 
 
“……the disease we fear is chirmale because you can get infected by a small cut 
…especially when slaughtering……but we know how to avoid it……we tie some barks of a 
local shrub around the wrist …if you cut yourself…you don’t go to the hospital….you wait 
till the boil is ripe and ruptures …..Then after there you can go to the hospital……..if you 
go to the hospital and they inject you …..You will die ….” 
- Slaughterhouse worker 
 
Similar sentiments were echoed by a milk vendor who claimed to have been infected by the 
disease chirmale and showed scars from a wound on the arm which healed following initial 
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boil-like manifestations on her skin which formed a pus-filled open wound. The milk vendor 
also explained that the bark of a special tree could be tied on an individuals’ wrist for protection 
in slaughtering or consuming meat from a sick animal. 
 
v) Animal Health 
Misuse of antibiotics is an emerging problem in the Bura area, with many individuals buying 
over-the-counter drugs and injecting animals without consulting veterinary professionals. 
Some are even using human medicine to treat animals which may lead to resistance in humans. 
 
“People go to the chemist, get antibiotic capsules like amoxicillin, open then up and make 
a suspension mixture with water then use needles to inject them to animals. It is becoming 
so much the kind of treating animals. People are acting like real vets here and they do 
look for experts to treat their animals. Maybe it’s because it’s cheap and easy to buy these 
drugs” 
 
“……..nowadays people buy capsules from pharmacies and use them to inject 
animals….they inject goats with 5 capsules …..Like 20 for cows and 50 for 
camels…..people have been doing this for a while now. 
 
“….animals injected with capsules cannot be healed with normal medicine used by vets if 
they fall sick……I don’t know who introduced this madness or knowledge to this area……” 
- Livestock market elder 
 
Many value chain actors pretend to have knowledge of specific zoonotic diseases in order to 
get drug names from veterinary officers or shop dealers, to then buy the drugs for administering 
treatment later. 
 
“They usually act like they know more so they just want to know the name of the drug so 
as to do it themselves.  And they consider calling you the doctor as expensive and they see 
it as an easy treatment option to do it themselves when they know the drug to use.” 
- Veterinary officer 
 
There is widespread scepticism of animal health workers who offer vaccinations, even when 
these are provided for free. In some cases, value chain actors reported having chased away 
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veterinary officers who have a legal mandate to vaccinate and test animals and should by law 
be facilitated in carrying out their duties. 
 
vi) Poor Infrastructure – (Lack of road network, public sanitation and hygiene facilities) 
The poor road network especially in the rainy season makes it difficult to get milk to market 
on time, meaning that it often spoils. Traders use donkeys, motorcycles and bicycles to 
transport milk to the marketplace, where bulking occurs. Sanitation is typically poor within and 
around the marketplace - there are often no toilets in the areas where women milk traders work, 
yet they are responsible for handling of human food. Observations made for the purpose of this 
study indicated that they operate near sites used for dumping, and that there is little or no 
structure in place to ensure safe and sanitary food handling (figures 36). Standards for places 
where food is handled are not met - milk is boiled but unprotect from dust, rains and flies that 
come from nearby open dumping (figure 37). 
  
Figure 36: Milk boiling shelters 
      
 
Figure 37: Open dumping in Bura town
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5.9 Proposals to Improve Awareness of Zoonotic Diseases, Enforcement and Adoption of 
Biosecurity Measures 
Table 37 shows the various proposals put forward by actors in the milk and meat value chains 
asked to suggest how enforcement of biosecurity measures by the authorities, and adoption by 
value chain actors could be improved. 
 
As evidenced table 37, value chain actors regard improved access to training as critically 
important in terms of facilitating their increased adoption of biosecurity measures, enabling 
them to better meet food safety and quality standards. Training could focus on imparting 
knowledge about diseases, transmission and preventative biosecurity measures of a practical 
nature to actors, and allow them to overcome the challenges of low level education coupled 
with low level of knowledge. 
 
Table 37: Proposals to change and improve adoption of biosecurity measures  
Proposal  Milk  
traders 
 n= 57 
Slaughterhouse  
Workers  
n=10 
Transporters  
n=35 
Butchers  
n=9 
Traders  
n=43 
Strengthen 
law on beef 
safety 
7.0 % - 11.43 % - 6.98 % 
Train all 
actors 
involved in 
livestock chain 
59.6 % 80 % 65.71 % 88.89 % 62.79 % 
Improve 
public 
education and 
veterinary 
extension 
services 
57.9 % 
 
50 % 60 % 66.67 % 69.77 % 
Licence all  
traders 
21 % 30 % 28.57 % 44.44 % 13.95 % 
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Ensure all 
actors in the 
animal value 
chain are 
responsible for 
food safety 
24.6 % 30 % 34.29 % 66.67 % 23.26 
 
Most value chain actors agree that there is a need to increase public awareness of zoonotic 
diseases, through increased and improved public health education and extension programmes. 
They say that the Government can be at the forefront in providing subsidised extension services 
while at the same time, can create a conducive policy environment which encourages private 
practitioners to bridge the gap in service provision. Licensing of value chain actors could also 
go a long way in improving quality of food and reducing occupational risks as only certified 
would be allowed to operate. 
 
Few value chain actors see the need to strengthen biosecurity laws or create new and more 
stringent laws. Instead, many advocate improving the enforcement of existing laws of which 
very few actors say they have knowledge of their existence. Most actors say that they cannot 
differentiate between voluntary measures and compulsory measures enshrined in the various 
statutes of the law, which are sometimes also conflicting in their nature, with county and 
national laws overlapping in some instances. 
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Chapter 6: Qualitative Risk Assessment of Hazards in Milk and Meat Value Chains 
There is growing advocacy for enforcement of farm to fork standards that safeguard food safety 
(Unnevehr 2000). Risk analysis is important in the context of identifying, communicating and 
managing risks in informal markets so that scarce resources can be allocated to effectively 
address the most critical risk points (Unnevehr 2000; Delia et al. 2008; ILRI 2012). 
 
A qualitative risk analysis was undertaken in Bura to evaluate the following questions: 
1. What is the likelihood of zoonoses spreading from an infected animal to humans? 
2. What is the likelihood of zoonoses spreading from infected to healthy animals? 
3. What is the likelihood of zoonoses spread from one area to another via value chains? 
 
6.1 Critical Control Points 
Critical risk points resulting from value chain actors’ occupational practices were identified in 
the course of this study and compared to existing literature to identify appropriate response 
mechanisms which could be adopted to minimise these biosecurity risks. The study used the 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) method to identify risks associated with the 
milk and meat value chains and to identify critical areas where value chain actors’ occupational 
practices could be corrected to reduce the risk of zoonotic disease spread and transmission to 
actors and consumers. 
 
6.2 Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
The HACCP method of risk analysis is based on the following steps or principles: 
1. Conduct a Hazard Analysis. Prepare a list of steps in the process where significant 
hazards occur, and describe the preventive measures. 
2. Identify the Critical Control Points (CCP’s) in the process. 
3. Establish critical limits for preventive measures associated with each identified CCP. 
4. Establish CCP monitoring requirements. Establish procedures for using the results of 
monitoring to adjust the process and maintain control. 
5. Establish corrective action to be taken when monitoring indicates that there is a 
deviation from an established critical limit. 
6. Establish effective record keeping procedures that document the HACCP system. 
7. Establish procedures to verify that the HACCP system is working correctly. 
(USDA 1997) 
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In cases where there is sufficient data available, hazard analysis is undertaken using prevalence 
or epidemiological data to identify risks and critical control point (USDA 1997). However, 
there is only a limited amount of data existing on the prevalence of zoonotic diseases in the 
milk and meat value chains in Bura and quantitative risk analysis is therefore not possible - 
hence, the need for a qualitative risk analysis approach as utilised by this research study as 
shown by figure 38. 
 
Figure 38: Risk Analysis 
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6.2.1 Risks 
Biosecurity risks exist at different levels in the milk and livestock value chain in Bura Tana 
were identified along the whole value chain (see figure 38 above). 
 
i) Community Level Risks 
There are several biosecurity risks at community level which require urgent intervention to 
curb transmission and spread of zoonotic diseases. Open defecation is common, and a very 
large proportion of the local population does not have access to latrines. Social-cultural practice 
influences latrine-use, with some households having access but still preferring to use the open 
and bushes for defecation. The town of Bura lacks a waste management system which is 
environmentally-friendly and the majority of the population practices open dumping of wastes. 
Garbage and faecal wastes contaminate the water bodies (irrigation canals) on which the 
majority of households are dependent for household water use and for irrigation (Fèvre et al. 
2009; Nsadha 2013). 
 
The majority of the population has no access to treated water sources and most fetch their water 
from canals which are also used for cleaning vehicles, animal watering and irrigation. Many 
households do not treat the water which they use - meaning that it is a key source of water-
borne zoonoses. There is evidence of high sero-prevalence of leptospirosis in the area, which 
may also be the case for other zoonotic diseases. Currently, there is little data available on sero-
prevalence of diseases due to the limited level of research which has taken place in the region. 
 
A lack of infrastructure puts the local population at risk as individuals are sometimes 
transported in the same vehicles which carry animals, exposing them to airborne zoonotic 
diseases as well as diseases which can be spread through contact or via body fluids. Bura 
market lacks an isolation ground to hold animals and as a consequence, different animal species 
from different source origins end up mixing. This can in some cases create the perfect 
conditions for diseases spread, as there are healthy and sick animals present, and most 
importantly, the vectors required for disease transmission. 
  
ii) Production Level Risks 
These are risks associated with animal production and biosecurity measures are designed to 
control the health status of animals from which milk or meat products destined for human 
consumption are derived (OIE 2006). This study identified a number of risks which contribute 
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to zoonotic disease transmission and spread. Most animals are not vaccinated which makes 
them vulnerable to diseases; while the purchase of untested animals can lead to infection of the 
entire herd into which these animals are subsequently introduced. The risks of vector-borne 
diseases are hard to control due to changing land use and emerging trade trends (Kariuki et al. 
2012). There is no proper record-keeping as regards to animal movement, which makes it hard 
to implement an animal traceability system and also to track zoonotic disease incidents and 
outbreaks. The corruption perpetuated by the police force and their failure to enforce the 
application for and use of animal movement certificates facilitates the spread and transmission 
of transboundary diseases. 
  
iii) Boiling and Bulking Level Risks 
Milk boiling is undertaken in open and unhygienic places. Risky practises such as milk testing 
through tasting are commonplace, and exposes milk traders to zoonotic diseases on daily basis. 
However, few ever present themselves for medical check-ups. Plastic containers used for milk 
transport is often not of food-grade quality and difficult to sterilise during washing. Milk traders 
use untreated canal water to clean containers. They occasionally use soap, however, this alone 
is not enough to ensure the sterilisation of containers and other equipment used. Traders often 
operate in open areas near a garbage dump with no access to latrines or water, and milk is 
exposed to dirt, flies and other contaminants. 
 
Few milk traders are conversant with regulations and only a handful of traders have received 
practical training in food handling. Most are uneducated and do not have the capacity to 
understand written information. Lack of permanent operating structures leads traders to not 
invest in biosecurity measures or undertake any value addition. Use of unsterilized plastic 
bottles for milk packaging which is also common can be a health risk. 
  
iv) Local Consumption Practises Risk 
Consumption of raw milk, blood, and in some case offals exposes value chain actors and the 
local population to zoonotic diseases. It is, however, difficult to change social-cultural practices 
regarding consumption as many see practices as traditional and are reluctant to change. 
Slaughter often takes place in the homestead and often meat consumed is never subjected to 
inspection. Consumption of the famous roast meat “Nyama choma” entails high risk, as meat 
is often roasted in a hurry or the fire is not hot enough to kill all pathogens present. The hygiene 
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of workers and places where food is prepared and handled are also significantly below the 
required standards (Nsadha 2013). 
 
v) Livestock Transport Risk 
Trekking exposes animals to pests and disease vectors along movement corridors especially if 
they pass through areas where there is wildlife. Transport in lorries often lead to the mixing of 
species (goats, sheep and cows) and often animals are so crowded in the vehicles that it 
facilitates disease transmission. Animals which are transported are often not inspected or only 
visual inspection is undertaken and it is difficult to identify animals which are asymptomatic 
yet nevertheless sick. Traders rarely look to obtain animal movement certificates and some 
choose instead to bribe their way to major towns. 
 
Animals are often transported along with other human consumables due to limited transport 
availability, which exposes human food to contamination by pathogens. In some cases, humans 
travel in the same vehicles as animals, therefore also putting themselves at risk of infection. 
Vehicles are cleaned near the rivers or canals, meaning that animal waste and slurry ends up in 
the water bodies which the local population relies on for domestic purposes. Vehicles are rarely 
disinfected during cleaning and individuals who undertake cleaning activities are never 
protected against zoonotic disease as they do not wear PPE. 
 
vi) Milk Transport Risk 
Most transporters are not trained in food handling or any hygiene protocols. This means that 
there is a risk that they contaminate the milk which they handle. They also expose themselves 
when handling milk, particularly where plastic containers are of poor quality and where they 
leak, contaminating surfaces with which they come into contact. Few transporters use PPE. 
Few milk value chain actors adhere to biosecurity laws and most do not have milk movement 
certificates or keep records of the origin of milk which they are transporting. 
  
vii) Livestock Trade Risk 
Non-isolation of animals in live animal markets allows for transmission of disease from sick 
to healthy animals. This poses a risk especially to farmers who buy animals for the purpose of 
restocking their herds. Transboundary animal trade brings new disease pests and parasites 
which pose a risk to the local herd population. Most livestock value chain actors do not use 
PPE while handling animals, undertaking body scoring or inspection which can be a source of 
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infection. Most animal deaths are never reported, making it difficult for the relevant authorities 
to maintain surveillance and diagnose zoonotic diseases early enough when an outbreak occurs. 
Dead animals are not properly disposed of, contributing to environmental pollution and 
providing a source of infection through accessibility to scavengers and vectors of the disease 
(FAO 2014). 
 
No traders keep records of animals traded. Most information is exchanged by word of mouth 
and no documentation of the origin or state of health ever takes place. 
  
viii) Slaughtering Risk 
Use of PPE is mandatory, however, livestock value chain actors only partially use PPE or not 
at all, during their day to day activities. This makes slaughterhouse workers capable of 
contaminating products they handle, serve as a reservoir for pathogens and also be at increased 
risk of zoonotic disease infections resulting from occupational activities (Al-azraqi et al. 2013; 
Xuan et al. 2013; Pal et al. 2013; Cook et al. 2013). 
 
A study by Abunna et al. (2008) indicates that the traditional method of meat inspection is not 
adequate to identify all the risks posed by the meat. An issue of public health concern, risk 
analysis to identify and reduce risks could help the society as a whole to reduce disease 
incidence and burden (Muwonge et al. 2012; Govender et al. 2013). Management of wastes 
from the slaughterhouse is also important in the context of minimising environmental 
contamination and result risk of exposure of the local population to pathogens (Koech et al. 
2012). 
 
ix) Marketing (Butcheries) Risk 
Most butchers do not use any PPE and have poor food handling practices. Workplaces in most 
cases are unclean and the walls are not well-painted. Butcheries are not well equipped to 
prevent deterioration in the quality of meat stored as they do not have refrigerators. Some actors 
use drugs such as khat or smoke cigarettes while serving customers or handling animals. Drugs 
have the ability to reduce actors’ perception of zoonotic disease risks. 
 
Materials used for meat packaging are often of poor quality - polythene and old newspapers 
are used in most cases. Newspapers alone are not a good way to pack foodstuffs as there is a 
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risk of contaminating food products which are wrapped inside. Most butcheries use untreated 
water to clean utensils and other equipment used for meat processing. 
 
6.2.2 Biosecurity Responses to Hazards and Risks 
Biosecurity risks pose and require a response at different levels, namely, farm level and value 
chain level. 
 
i) Farm Level Biosecurity 
Farm level risk assessment and biosecurity analysis in Bura Tana constitutes the core of a thesis 
undertaken in parallel with this study (Isuyi 2015). Measures can be targeted at reducing 
disease incidence in farm buildings and other facilities, farm surroundings and environmental 
control; and risks related to health conditions of animals introduced to farms, animal feeding 
and watering, veterinary drugs, farm management, and preparation of animals for slaughter, as 
well as at improving record keeping and traceability of animals (OIE 2006). Farm level 
biosecurity costs should be kept low enough to ensure profitability and also feasibility of 
adoption of biosecurity measures (Siekkinen et al. 2008; Simon-Grifé et al. 2013) 
 
Control using biosecurity measures at farm level is beneficial as it ensures safety of animal 
sourced (including: milk and milk products, meat and meat products). Farm level biosecurity 
is often considered to be the first line of disease control and prevention (Noordhuizen & 
Frankena 1999) and it has been documented that a reduction in disease at farm level, incidence 
of disease downstream in the value chain are also reduced (Collins & Wall 2004) . 
 
i) Value Chain Level Biosecurity 
Risks associated with milk and livestock safety hazards require a cooperative approach of the 
value chain as a whole (from farmers, meat processors and consumers to government 
authorities) as any lapse at any point of the value chain (meat inspection, meat processing, 
distribution and meal preparation) from farm to fork poses a risk to human health as well as 
environmental and animal health (Butler et al. 2003; FAO 2011). 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 Importance of the Meat and Livestock Value Chains in Bura Tana 
This study has highlighted the importance of the milk and meat value chains for the economy 
of the Bura Tana region, in terms of income generation, employment and nutrition. Studies 
have shown that the livestock industry is an important sector in Kenya, employing up to 50 % 
of agricultural labour (6 million pastoralists and agro pastoralists) and contributing to between 
5-12% of annual GDP and as much as 47 % of agricultural GDP (USaid 2012). In pastoral 
areas, in particular, it is the sole source of employment for more than 90 % of the labour force 
and generates approximately 95% of household income (USaid 2012; International Committee 
of the Red Cross 2005). Most value chain actors who buy and sell animals and animal products 
are poor and rely greatly on animal source food for nutrition. Livestock value chains facilitate 
women's’ empowerment in the context of employment in production and marketing, as well as 
in terms of enabling them to ensure the food security and nutrition of their households (Mamo 
2013; Herrero et al. 2013). 
 
The zoonotic diseases considered by this study pose serious threats to the livelihoods of 
pastoral farmers and to health of all associated actors. It is difficult to control spread and 
transmission of diseases which are associated with livestock movement in pastoral areas, as 
social-cultural tradition dictates that pastoralists are always on the move looking for water and 
pasture for their livestock. Trade and transboundary trade, in particular, has a similar effect as 
regards contributing to zoonotic disease spread especially where livestock inspection and 
testing is not properly undertaken (Chengula et al. 2013; Rich et al. 2008). 
 
In the past, epidemics of the diseases taken into consideration by this study have had severe 
socio-economic impacts, primarily due to poor preparedness of institutional and value chain 
actors, as well as the local population as regards disease control. During a RVF outbreak in 
2006, for example, many livestock value chain actors experienced major losses due to the 
imposition of livestock movement and trade bans and extensive quarantining of animals. Milk 
traders also were prohibited from trading, selling or buying milk for a long period of time. This 
had severe consequences for households reliant on livestock for income and those trading in 
animals and animal products (Chengula et al. 2013; Marcotty et al. 2013; Rich & Perry 2011; 
Rich et al. 2008). 
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Consumption of uninspected meat and raw milk is very common in Bura. In particular, 
consumption of raw offals and traditionally fermented milk (a local delicacy) poses a challenge 
to policy makers as it exposes a large proportion of the local population - both value chain 
actors and consumers - to zoonotic diseases (Fyumagwa et al. 2013; Kang’ethe et al. 2000; 
Chengula et al. 2013). 
 
Livestock value chains are highly informal and poorly regulated in Kenya (Omore et al. 2002; 
FAO 2006b). Informal market contexts such as Bura are not well understood or researched in 
the context of zoonotic disease spread and transmission, with most research focusing on formal 
markets in developed countries. Few innovative ways to improve food safety have been 
proposed to solve problems facing value chain actors (Hooton & Omore 2007; FAO 2006b) ; 
and there is sufficient evidence to suggest that most value chain actors in Bura have received 
little or no training at all in milk or livestock handling, with few having knowledge of 
biosecurity principles or how to implement them (Omore et al. 2002; Tuei 2010).  
 
Milk traded is not treated for the purpose of value addition or preservation, with the majority 
of milk traders purchasing and selling raw unpasteurised milk, confirming the findings of 
Omore et al. (2002). Many milk value chain actors use plastic containers to transport milk 
despite the fact that they are often not of food-grade material. They are used as they are easy 
to access, require low capital investment and reduce losses associated with frequent 
confiscation by public health authorities of containers. Given the current situation of mistrust 
between value chain actors and regulating authorities responsible for ensuring food safety 
standards are met, policies should aim to increase access to training and certification which 
would also help to improve quality and safety standards, thereby increasing consumers’ choice 
of products. Informal milk and meat value chains such as in Bura Tana will continue to 
dominate the market for the foreseeable future. However as evidenced by this study and other 
published research such as Omore et al. (2002) and Hooton & Omore (2007), policies exclude 
small actors or fail to encourage them to invest in long term assets which are important 
determinants of the adoption and implementation of biosecurity measures. 
 
The informal sector is dominated by actors with low education levels and a low level of 
knowledge regarding zoonotic diseases and biosecurity measures. Public health education and 
training of value chain actors could play an important role in changing the attitudes and 
perceptions of both actors and the local population. Information dissemination and skills 
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development could enhance adoption of biosecurity practices by butcheries, slaughterhouse 
workers, milk traders and transporters. This has been proposed to have a two-fold positive 
outcome, namely, availability of safer foods for consumers and reduced exposure, risks and 
human health losses associated with zoonotic disease spread, transmission and infection (Al-
azraqi et al. 2013; Omore et al. 2002). 
 
7.2 Gendered adoption of biosecurity measures and disease risk reduction 
There is a gap in terms of gender participation in the milk and meat value chains in Bura Tana, 
with women often marginalised in the livestock sector due to the social, cultural and religious 
norms of the communities living in the area. Similar to previous studies of these value chains 
in Kenya (Onono et al. 2013; IFAD 2012a; Miller 2012), this study found that the livestock 
value chain was male-dominated; while the majority of the actors in the milk value chain were 
female, however, male actors engaged as transporters and large buyers selling to other towns 
and cities. 
 
Brown et al. (2011) found that the slaughterhouse industry, in particular, tends to be male-
dominated with women excluded in slaughtering activities as in the case of this study. The 
omission of women in some activities threatens health and safety resulting from their poor 
adoption of measures due to the gender gap in access to information and financial resources. 
 
As previously mentioned, the milk value chain analysed for the purpose of this study 
predominantly comprised female actors. This indicates that there the cultural and economic 
make-up of pastoral communities is changing and that women are slowly gaining a foothold in 
the male-dominated livestock sector. It suggests that gender roles are changing and that women 
are increasingly becoming involved in small business to supplement household income and 
take care of their households. They are now engaging in activities such as farming, livestock 
trading, selling of milk and milk products as a primary source of employment. 
 
Women participation in the overall livestock sector, however, is still low and constrained by 
culture and social norms which in turn hinders complete participation in the value chain. This 
has been highlighted by the studies of FAO (2012) and IFAD (2011) and is also evidenced in 
this study, by the fact that some activities - for example, transport in the context of the milk 
value chain - are still male-dominated activities (Fratkin et al. 2011; Lynch 2011; Herrero et 
al. 2013). 
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Based on the gender composition of milk and meat value chain activities, this study concludes 
that risk profiles differ depending on the product or animal being handled, and that different 
value chain actors have different risk profiles. The level of risk faced by actors is directly linked 
to their ability to assert themselves, with women - despite being equally important and with 
productive participation in the value chain - having comparatively lower access to education 
and training, and often, a weaker say in decision and policy-making due to the social-cultural 
bias of their environment. As a consequence, they also have lower knowledge of zoonotic 
disease transmission and spread, and the importance of adopting and implementing biosecurity 
risks. 
 
This study found that both men and women faced high transaction costs in terms of obtaining 
market information, financial credit, insurance and biosecurity information, as has been shown 
to be typically the case in pastoral areas (Rota 2005). Institutional innovations such as livestock 
and milk marketing auctions; contractual arrangements between slaughterhouses, meat 
processors and buying agents; and informal marketing cooperatives do not exist in Bura. The 
presence of these innovations could significantly enhance the productivity and profitability of 
the milk and meat value chains in Bura, therefore also paving the way for pastoral value chain 
actors - and therefore, also notably, women - to benefit from and participate in the national 
milk and livestock value chains (Little 2011). 
 
7.3 Knowledge of Diseases 
Low knowledge of zoonotic diseases is a common phenomenon in many developing countries 
where disease outbreaks of anthrax, bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis, leptospirosis, 
echinococcosis, cysticercosis, fasciolosis, leishmaniasis, trypanosomiasis, RVF and rabies 
affect large proportions of the population (Marcotty et al. 2013). 
 
This study found knowledge of zoonotic diseases to be very low among milk and livestock 
value chain actors interviewed and observed in carrying out their day to day activities. 
Knowledge of cysticercosis/taeniasis and RVF were higher than for other diseases, most likely 
due to the fact that taeniasis is endemic and there have been a number of recent RVF outbreaks. 
In 2006-2007, an outbreak of RVF led the government to ban all livestock and animal product 
trade, forcing value chain actors to cease their activities. Many were pushed out of business 
and unable to recover, and had to look for alternative sources of income. 
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Value chain actors know zoonotic diseases by their local name which suggests that information 
about historical disease events has been passed from one generation to the next by word of 
mouth. However, overall knowledge of zoonotic diseases and biosecurity measures is low 
among value chain actors in addition to the local population, makes it difficult to control disease 
spread and transmission. The extent to which this, in addition to low education levels, impacts 
on the management of zoonotic disease outbreaks has been documented in other studies 
(Chengula et al. 2013; Marcotty et al. 2013). 
 
Access to information is limited, and there is little understanding among value chain actors of 
the linkages between human infection and the occupational risks taken in meat and milk 
handling; and the role actors can play in amplifying zoonotic disease outbreaks through cross-
contamination (Cook et al. 2013; Chengula et al. 2013; Marcotty et al. 2013). 
 
7.4 Knowledge of Laws 
Understanding how market dynamics work is important in context of designing biosecurity 
measures which will be readily adopted (Kilimo Trust 2009) as value chain actors do not 
implement measures or follow regulations which lead to increased operation costs and a 
reduction in profits. Enforcement of rules and regulations is difficult where markets are 
informal, as is often the case in developing countries and levels of implementation by actors 
are very low. 
 
In Kenya, there is a gap between policy and practice, and many policy-makers are increasingly 
realising that greater efforts need to be made to bridge this gap to ensure development of 
biosecurity measures which are acceptable to informal markets actors (Kioko 2012; Kilimo 
Trust 2012; Delia 2012). This study showed that most actors engaged in the milk and meat 
value chains in Bura Tana are not familiar with the standards and legal regulations as stipulated 
by various Kenyan statutes, OIE, FAO and WHO, and that even in cases where there is 
awareness and actors have relevant knowledge, implementation of these laws is very low.  
 
The low levels of knowledge identified by this study among milk and meat value chain actors, 
suggests that there is an urgent need to assess the type of education, training and extension 
services provided to actors as regards adopting and implementing biosecurity measures. In 
addition to ensuring that information would be better disseminated, it has been suggested that 
it is important to also ensure that this information would be relevant, needs-based and respond 
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more directly to the biosecurity risks faced by actors in their day to day activities (Kilimo Trust 
2009). 
 
The results of this study suggest that governmental structures in Kenya lacks funding and 
capacity and that policies are currently being formulated without the critically important 
involvement of those targeted - namely, milk and meat value chain actors - thereby failing to 
keep pace with the rapidly changing dynamics of these value chains. Inability through lack of 
opportunity to contribute to policy-making has resulted in resentment of the legal frameworks 
in place as regards biosecurity, with many value chain actors expressing their reluctance to 
implement biosecurity measures in their day to day activities (Jabbar & Delia 2012).  
 
To a large extent, the failure of policies as well as institutional authorities with a mandate to 
enforce standards and legal regulations to incentivise adoption of biosecurity measures by milk 
and meat value chain actors can be attributed to the transfer of inappropriate technologies, a 
poor delivery mechanism for technologies, inefficient public service provision and the 
existence of small uncompetitive private sector, as well as finally, the hidden economic agendas 
of few powerful individuals and legal entities who have significant clout in policy-making 
processes (AU/IBAR 2004; Birner & Resnick 2010) 
  
7.5 Access to Information 
High transaction costs associated with obtaining information and accessing extension services 
discourages value chain actors from increasing their knowledge of zoonotic diseases and the 
preventive biosecurity measures which they can take to not only protect themselves, but also 
curb further spread and transmission along the value chain. 
 
The Kenyan budgetary allocation to agriculture has steadily declined in recent years, leading 
to an accompanying reduction in investment in extension services of fundamental importance 
to value chain actors and the livestock sector as a whole - namely, training, education and 
provision of information (Kilimo Trust 2009). Flow and dissemination of information within 
the livestock and milk value chains is weak and this undermines actors’ ability to learn about 
and adopt biosecurity measures in their day to day activities. 
 
In Bura, there is insufficient information about markets, prices, taxes, laws and regulations 
which reduces competitiveness of the value chains and creates an unfair playing field, with 
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large-scale actors have greater access to information and resources compared to small- and 
medium-scale actors, and therefore realising greater profitability and productivity gains from 
the implementation of biosecurity measures (Leposo 2007; Chengula et al. 2013; Rota 2005; 
Bett et al. 2009). 
 
7.6 Biosecurity Measures in Practice 
i) Livestock Biosecurity Measures 
The results of this study indicate that the most common livestock biosecurity measure adopted 
by traders (86% of livestock traders) in Bura Tana is dipping although not done as a biosecurity 
measure. In theory an important measure contributing to zoonotic disease control; in practice, 
however, it is somewhat of an inefficient measure. This is due to the fact that the pastoral 
tradition and culture underpinning the milk and livestock value chains implies significant 
animal movement, and dipped animals can therefore pick up new parasites or come into contact 
with disease vectors while interacting with wildlife in grazing lands. 
 
Future investment in livestock corridors would help to control the spillover of zoonotic diseases 
at the wildlife-livestock-human interface, however, at present, animals which are infected 
simply end up in markets where they mix with healthy animals, thus serving to spread and 
transmit zoonotic diseases further (Goverment of Kenya 2013; Marcotty et al. 2013; Kariuki et 
al. 2012). 
 
In addition to trek their animals to the market or slaughterhouse, small-scale value chain actors 
frequently transport animals in the same vehicles as humans or alongside products intended for 
human consumption. This has been shown to increase risks of cross-contamination and disease 
transmission (Leposo 2007). Unable to adhere to biosecurity principles related to animal 
movement due to limited or lack of resources, these actors would greatly benefit from private-
public partnerships which would enable them implement value chain biosecurity measures - in 
this case, particularly related to animal movement - as well as better respond to disease 
outbreaks to reduce the often adverse impacts (Rich et al. 2008). 
 
As evidenced by this study, to a certain extent, the risk of zoonotic disease transmission and 
spread associated with animal movement stems from a range of factors. In addition to value 
chain actors’ practices and failure to adopt biosecurity measures, surveillance and monitoring 
by the authorities charged with regulating animal movement, issuing certificates and 
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undertaking animal health inspection activities is poor; while corruption and bribery are also 
responsible for animal movement often being illegally authorized and thus, undocumented. 
 
Infrastructure which is important from a biosecurity perspective, such as holding grounds, 
quarantine stations stock routes and water-points is not in place in many regions of Kenya and 
where such infrastructure does exists is often old and inadequate. Animal traceability is 
therefore a major challenge, with many animals originating from neighbouring countries 
posing an additional challenge to the implementation or enforcement of a traceability system 
already undermined by a lack of technological and institutional capacity on the part of the 
relevant authorities (Matete et al. 2014; Aklilu 2008). 
 
ii) Personal (Occupational) Biosecurity Measures 
A previous study by Cook et al. (2013) undertaken in western Kenya found low rates of PPE 
use among milk and meat value chain actors, a finding which also proved correct in the case 
of this study which focused on Bura Tana. PPE is an important personal biosecurity measure 
which protects value chain actors from the risks associated with occupational exposure to 
pathogens. It is also regarded as a critical measure in the context of reducing contamination of 
animal source products by value chain actors and spread of zoonotic diseases along a value 
chain. 
 
The results of this study indicate that most actors engaged in the milk and meat value chains in 
Bura Tana do not use aprons, gumboots or even a hair net (head covering or cap) in undertaking 
their day to day activities. This suggests that education and training programmes should be 
initiated to increase actors’ awareness of and sensitivity to the biosecurity risks associated with 
their day to day activities. PPE should be more aggressively promoted by public health 
authorities as comfortable to wear over other work clothes, to encourage acceptability - thereby 
directly increasing the likelihood of this fundamentally important biosecurity measure being 
adopted by value chain actors (Haileselassie et al. 2013). 
 
iii) Food Safety, Hygiene and Sanitation Biosecurity Measures 
This study found that many of the premises used for milk trading and slaughtering activities 
did not meet the standards set out by health and safety regulations. Slaughterhouse hygiene, in 
particular, was poor - confirming the findings of Cook, et al. (2013) from a study undertaken 
in western Kenya, as well as other studies from other developing country contexts including 
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Ethiopia (Haileselassie et al. 2013) South Sudan (Aburi 2012) Uganda (Rösel & Holmes 2012; 
Tatwangire 2013; agriterra 2012)and Vietnam (Xuan et al. 2013). 
 
As evidenced by the results of this and other studies, adoption of biosecurity measures related 
to sanitation and hygiene constitutes a major challenge for small-scale milk and meat value 
chain actors who lack access to the financial capital required for investments (Kilimo Trust 
2009). One of the reasons for value chain actors’ low levels of sanitation and hygiene may be 
the fact that private sector infrastructure development is limited in marginal areas such as Bura 
Tana, with investors reluctant to initiate the construction of plants or waste-water treatment 
facilities which could potentially operate below capacity and therefore not be worthy profit-
generating investments. 
 
Although value chain actors lack access to an adequate sanitation and sewerage system, waste 
disposal facilities and in many cases, piped treated water - a lack of infrastructure, however, is 
not the only factor contributing to widespread water contamination and the spread of zoonotic 
diseases. Social-cultural behaviour of actors as regards handling and disposal of animal waste, 
in particular, is problematic, given that the majority of the local population relies on canal water 
for household use (Herrero et al. 2013; Kilimo Trust 2009). 
 
In Bura and other regions dominated by informal markets, and where inspection and testing is 
rarely undertaken, it is difficult to track antimicrobial agents in foodstuffs such as milk. Most 
antimicrobial agents cannot be eliminated through heat treatment, meaning that they will still 
be present after boiling, thus posing a threat to individuals with allergies to certain antibiotics 
(Omore et al. 2002). 
 
7.7 Policy and Regulatory Mechanisms 
A number of policy and regulatory mechanisms are used to monitor and control the livestock 
sector in Kenya, and all actors engaged in the milk and meat value chains must ensure that they 
comply with and honour: 
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1.  Compulsory products standards that meet laid down food safety standards 
2.  Voluntary standards which may include biosecurity measures 
3.  Dairy and Public Health legislation 
4.  Regulatory inspection 
5. Courts which impose fines and punishments 
6.  Business licenses and permits 
(Foreman & Leeuw 2013) 
 
In Kenya, the laws and regulations governing the milk and meat value chains and food safety 
fall under the auspices of several institution and ministries. These include the Kenya Bureau of 
Standards (KEBS), the Department of Veterinary Services (DVS) and the Ministry of Health. 
 
Laws are implemented as follows by government institutions and institutions: 
 
1.   Ministry of Health - The Public Health Act Cap 242, Food, Drug and Chemical 
Substances Act Cap 254 and Radiation Protection Act Cap 243 
2.   Kenya Dairy Board in liaison with KEBS - The Dairy Act Cap 336 
3.   DVS with KEBS - The Meat Control Act Cap 356, Animal Diseases Act Cap 364 
4.   Department of Veterinary Services - Animal diseases Act Cap 364 
5.   Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS) - The Standards Act Cap 496 
 
The laws most relevant to value chain actors in undertaking their day to day activities include: 
 
1. Public Health Act Cap.242 
2. Radiation Protection Act Cap.243 (in the case of irradiated foods) 
3. Food Drugs & Chemical Substances Act Cap. 254 
4. Agriculture Act Cap 318 
5. Dairy Industry Act Cap. 336 
6. Meat Control Act Cap. 356:1 
7. Animal diseases Act Cap. 364 
8. Customs & excise Act Cap. 496 
9. The Standards Act Cap 496 
(Kilonzo & Gathura n.d.; University of Nairobi 2014) 
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The institutions and agencies tasked with enforcing standards often have insufficient resources 
and/or qualified personnel to carry out mandated public health and sanitation duties, 
particularly in remote and marginalised areas of Kenya such as Bura Tana. As evidenced by 
this study, ill-equipped and underfunded, they are not in a position to enforce policies, often 
maintaining a very tight balance between hiring new personnel and obtaining the basic 
resources needed to ensure their day to day institutional functioning - thus leaving only limited 
funds for movement for example fuel and vehicles (Jabbar & Delia 2012; Kang’ethe et al. 
2010). Underfunding and misappropriation of funds not only leads to understaffing, transport 
problems and lack of equipment but in some cases also lack of professionals capable of utilising 
available equipment (Feder et al. 2011). 
 
This study brings to the forefront an issue at the heart of decentralised and devolved policy-
making in Kenya, namely, the fact that laws formulated at national and county level are often 
competing or even contradictory in nature. One case which illustrates this conflict of interest 
that exists is the nexus between the wildlife act and disease free zone provision laws (Aklilu 
2008; Benka 2012). Some laws in use are outdated or irrelevant, while responsibility for the 
enforcement of other laws is divided across several ministries without a central coordinating 
unit or authority - meaning that these laws are never completely enforced in the context of 
regulating animal production, health and also marketing activities (AU/IBAR 2004). 
 
One of the main reasons for the disconnect between enforcement of and adherence to 
regulations governing the milk and meat value chains and food safety in Kenya, is that there is 
often low participation by value chain actor actors in policy formulation. As evidenced by this 
study, there is a need to invest in grassroots consultation to increase actors’ participation at all 
stages of the policy-making process (AU/IBAR 2004). Until recently most policies did not 
even address the needs of the majority of milk and livestock value chain actors - as reflected 
by the ‘Milk Wars’ which took place during the early 2000s, whereby policy changes led to 
informal milk actors being harassed and larger powerful milk companies gaining notoriety for 
their rent seeking behaviour (Process and partenership for pro-poor policy change Project 
2006). 
 
As outlined by Omore et al. (2002) and evidenced by the results of this study, the threat posed 
by value chain spread and transmission of zoonotic diseases could be addressed through simple 
biosecurity measures regarding handling practices and preparation of meat and milk before 
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consumption. However, Kenya still lags behind other developed and developing countries in 
bringing its biosecurity response on par with standards set by the EU and OIE. Animal health 
and food safety is inadequate due to low resource allocation over a long period of time; while 
the capacity of institutions and agencies responsible for public health and sanitation to swiftly 
react in cases of sporadic outbreaks of economically important zoonotic diseases is also 
undermined - thus leading to continued economic losses, as well as high rates of human and 
animal mortality. 
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Chapter 8: Recommendations 
8.1 Short to Immediate Term Intervention 
The biosecurity gaps identified by this study require urgent intervention. Low knowledge 
among value chain actors could be addressed through education and training programmes, 
aimed at increasing actors’ understanding of zoonotic diseases and their transmission routes, 
and awareness of biosecurity measures which can be adopted to reduce occupational risks faced 
in day to day activities and improve food safety. In addition, information could be provided 
and disseminated to the local population on sanitation, hygiene, waste disposal and food 
preparation. 
 
The county government could invest in basic public health and sanitation infrastructure such 
as toilets and market sheds in the marketplace and near to slaughterhouses or along road 
reserves to improve value chain actors’ hygiene and sanitation practices, as well to curb 
environmental pollution and in particular, contamination of water bodies. 
 
Current food safety standards could be improved and the biosecurity risks as well as health 
issues stemming from poor packaging tackled through the use of low-cost packaging 
technologies which could be promoted by the county government through establishment of 
favourable tax regimes and policies more specifically regulating products and materials used 
for food packaging. 
 
Good governance at all institutional levels should be encouraged to improve the efficiency and 
efficacy of public sector service delivery, as well as to eliminate corruption across the livestock 
industry (Birner 2007). Rent seeking behaviour should be shunned and participation by value 
chain actors and the wider population in policy-making should become a norm. There should 
be strict enforcement of standards and regulations to reduce non-compliance with compulsory 
biosecurity measures, while at the same time; an innovative approach should be identified to 
promote implementation of voluntary measures by value chain actors. 
 
One mechanism which could facilitate greater adoption of biosecurity measures, as well as 
improve value chain actors’ bargaining power and provide a platform facilitating greater access 
to the capital for required for investments and value addition activities is the formation of 
cooperatives by milk and meat value chain actors currently engaged in the informal market. In 
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addition to increasing productivity and profitability of the value chains, it would give rise to a 
form of self-regulation within the informal industry. 
  
8.2 Medium to Long Term Intervention 
Medical care provision should be improved through the purchase of diagnosis kits and hiring 
of qualified laboratory personnel to realise a reduction in the number of cases of misdiagnosis 
of a zoonotic disease based on the symptoms observed. Greater levels of scenario planning and 
contingency planning could increase the capacity of institutions to swiftly respond in cases of 
disease outbreaks, while also ensuring efficient allocation of resources. Improvements in the 
provision of extension services are required to expand coverage and ensure availability of 
essential resources - both material and personnel - in remote and marginalised predominantly 
pastoral areas such as Bura Tana. 
 
Research collaboration between institutions responsible for human and animal health and 
related issues should be encouraged as envisaged under a so-called ‘One Health’ approach. 
Information sharing and harmonisation of data from different institutions could significantly 
improve and streamline public health service delivery by eliminating duplication and conflicts 
while also eliminating the ‘silo culture’ of government institutions (Kilimo Trust 2009). 
Private-public partnerships should be pursued using facilitative policy-making to bridge gaps 
in areas where the government is currently not in a position to take action - namely, in the 
provision of healthcare, extension services, milk cooling facilities, abattoir facilities etc. 
 
8.3 Biosecurity Measures: Costs vs. Ease of Implementation 
Adoption by a value chain actor of an innovation is contingent on he/she having information 
regarding the positive and negative impacts associated with the potential innovation to be 
implemented. In the case of this study, for example, actors’ knowledge - which is directly 
related to the degree to which they have access to information - enables them to make informed 
choices regarding biosecurity measures available. 
 
Most value chain actors are reluctant to adopt biosecurity measures as society stands to benefit 
more than they themselves, given the costs which are typically incurred. The impacts that are 
of most concern to actors include the extent to which zoonotic disease risks negatively impact 
on their businesses and the direct expenditures which will result from investment in biosecurity 
measures (see figure 29). Control of zoonotic disease is a social interest (gain); and may 
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therefore be in conflict with the private interests of value chain actors who engage in business 
to make profits (Kristensen & Jakobsen 2011; Casal et al. 2007). 
 
Policies and regulations can be used to compel value chain actors to adopt biosecurity 
measures, especially where there is evidence that such measures generate win-win scenario for 
both actors and consumers. Incentives are required to encourage behaviour change and 
adoption of biosecurity measures (Kristensen & Jakobsen 2011). The perceived benefits of a 
strategy are a big motivator for adoption particularly where it is viewed as eliminating risks 
faced in business. Perceptions of the risks of a zoonotic disease are important in understanding 
the behaviour of value chain actors who directly or indirectly choose and design their own risk 
management strategies through their decision-making and action-taking (Valeeva et al. 2011). 
 
The biosecurity measures recommended for adoption by value chain actors are often seen as 
being too many in number and too diverse in nature, leading to confusion among actors who 
have to decide which measures to adopt or not adopt (Moore et al. 2008). Value chain actors 
are typically reluctant and unwillingness to adopt measures which require them to make 
significant changes (Gunn et al. 2008). 
 
Biosecurity measures are selected based on their ease of implementation (see figure 39) and 
the extent to which their benefits and purpose are understood by actors. Taking this into 
account, as well as the context of value chain actors’ education and current knowledge levels, 
it is clear that the benefits associated with actors’ adoption of measures should be better 
explained than is currently the case in Bura Tana. 
 
At a fundamental level, measures recommended by the regulatory authorities should have low 
associated costs and the transaction cost associated with acquiring information regarding 
adoption and implementation should be low enough to be manageable by actors without 
burdening them with extra costs (Gunn et al. 2008). 
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Figure 39: Matrix of Biosecurity Cost vs. Ease of Implementation 
 
 Ease of Implementation 
C 
o 
s 
t 
Easy - 
Expensive 
Somehow Easy - 
Expensive 
Difficult – Expensive 
Testing for 
diseases 
Isolation of 
animals 
Quarantine 
facilities 
Public 
education 
Vaccinations 
Cooling facilities 
Pasteurization 
Sterilization of milk (in 
bottle) 
UHT (ultra-high-
temperature) treatment 
institutional capacity  
Certification 
Sewer systems  
Testing labs  
Good infrastructure  
Good governance and  
Laws and policies  
Competent body of inspectors 
(veterinarians, meat 
inspectors) 
Testing and culling 
Easy - 
Medium Cost 
Somehow Easy – 
Medium Cost 
Difficult - Medium Cost 
Protective 
clothing  
Meat 
inspection 
Refrigeration  
Toilets  
Public education 
Food testing  
Aluminium milk containers  
New food laws  
Testing equipment 
Animals tracing 
Easy - Cheap Somehow Easy - Cheap Difficult – Cheap 
Washing 
hands  
Disinfection 
Water 
treatment 
Sanitation use  
Premises 
inspections 
Medical check ups 
Licencing  
Ante mortem inspection  
post-mortem examination 
Manure disposals 
Low cost packaging 
137 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
As evidenced by this study, from farm to fork, each and every actor participant in developing 
country context milk and meat value chains has a role to play in curbing the spread and 
transmission of zoonotic diseases of economic. 
 
Control of zoonotic diseases at a fundamental level is a public good; and milk and meat value 
chain actors through the adoption of biosecurity measures in their day to day activities can 
significantly contribute to efforts at local, national and international levels to prevent and also 
respond in the aftermath of zoonotic disease outbreak incidents. 
 
Value chain actors’ knowledge as regards the degree to which they expose themselves and 
other actors including consumers - to zoonotic diseases through their personal hygiene and 
sanitation, as well as livestock and food handling practices is limited. In this context, there is 
an urgent need to introduce legislation regulating value chain actor’ roles and responsibilities 
as regards implementing biosecurity measures and practices in accordance with statutes and 
relevant food handling standards. 
 
The probable impacts of zoonotic disease outbreaks should be modelled to better inform policy-
making, and recommendations as regards biosecurity measures appropriate for adoption by 
value chain actors made on the basis that these respond to biosecurity risks which have been 
clearly identified through participatory analysis of risks faced in the informal milk and 
livestock value chains, while taking into account social, religious and cultural values. 
 
The capacity and skills of value chain actors to prevent and respond to zoonotic disease 
outbreaks is low, and could be significantly improved through education and training 
programmes, as well as certification mechanisms incentivising adoption of improved 
occupational and food handling practices. 
 
Long term mechanisms should be established to encourage adoption of biosecurity measures, 
and the capacity of institutions with the mandate to enforce regulations and promote 
information sharing should be developed. Synergies should be identified between different 
institutions and agencies to maximise the biosecurity benefits which can be realised through 
efficient allocation of scarce resources. 
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A transdisciplinary and multi-stakeholder approach is required to tackling the problem of 
zoonotic disease spread and transmission, and in designing biosecurity strategies capable of 
swiftly and efficiently responding to current and future disease outbreaks. 
 
Providing an “umbrella” framework for the sharing of human, capital and material resources 
across low-resource countries, promotion of biosecurity through the global ‘One Health’ and 
‘EcoHealth’ initiatives, for example, could significantly reduce the extent to which zoonotic 
diseases have a far-reaching and adverse economic, social, environmental and productivity 
impacts on low-resource, low-income developing countries such as Kenya. 
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